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POST-CONNELL DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR'S NONSTATUTORY
EXEMPTION FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS
For a number of years after Congress passed the Sherman Act' in 1890,
the United States Supreme Court used the antitrust laws to regulate labor ac-
tivity. 2
 As Congress passed major labor legislation,' however, the Supreme
Court recognized that Congress viewed the labor laws rather than the antitrust
laws as the primary regulator of labor activity. 4 Consequently, labor activity
was exempted from antitrust scrutiny in certain situations.' Yet, the Court has
never granted labor a complete exemption from the antitrust laws. In one of
the Supreme Court's more cogent labor/antitrust decisions, .justice Black
observed that it would be anomalous to assume that Congress had intended to
give unions "complete and unreviewable authority to aid business groups" in
' Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. 55 1-7 (1976).
2 Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to
Union Activities, 73 YALE L. J. 14, 31 (1963). For example, in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908), the famous Danbury Hatters case, a union-organized consumer boycott of nonunion hat
manufacturers was held to be a combination in restraint of trade. Id. at 301.
3 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C, $S 101-115 (1976); Wagner
Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 29 U .S.0 . 55 151-169 (1976).
4 Congress first sought to protect labor unions from antitrust regulation by enacting 55
6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 and 738 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 5 17 and 29 U.S.C. 5 52
(1976).
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part: "Nothing contained in the anti-
trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence or operation of labor organizations . . . or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate ob-
jectives thereof . . 15 U.S.C. 5 17 (1976)."
Section 20 of the Clayton Act lists specific labor activities which may not be restrained
or enjoined, and further states that such activities shall not be held to violate any other laws, 29
U.S.C. 5 52 (1976). See 1 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAWS 55 4.03-4.04 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
KHEEL].
At first, the Supreme Court narrowly construed the language of 55 6 and 20. In
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 4-43 (1921), the Court held that the statutory ex-
emption of the Clayton Act would apply only to primary disputes between employers and em-
ployees, and not to a secondary boycott instituted by a machinists' union in New York against
the products of a printing press manufacturer who was being struck by machinists in Michigan.
Id. at 471-77. See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n of North
America, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); Coronado Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
The Court finally began in earnest to accommodate tabor and antitrust policies in
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). The approach taken by the Court in Apex
Hosiery, however, was not followed in later decisions. Instead of declaring that certain labor ac-
tivities were exempt from the antitrust laws, the Court held that the scope of the Sherman Act
was not broad enough to apply to certain kinds of anticompetitive restraints. See St. Antoine, Con-
nell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 606-07 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as St. Antoine, Connell]. The union in Apex Hosiery engaged in a violent primary sitdown strike,
310 U.S. at 418-82, which restrained trade by interfering with the flow of goods in interstate
commerce. Id. at 484. The Court noted, however, that the primary purpose of the union's activi-
ty was to promote labor interests rather than to restrain interstate commerce. Id. at 501.
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frustrating the primary objectives of the antitrust laws.s The judiciary thus has
the difficult task of reconciling two conflicting congressional policies — one
seeking "to preserve business competition and to proscribe business
monopoly,'" and the other seeking "to preserve the rights of labor to organize
through the agency of collective bargaining. "a
When labor activity is exempted from the antitrust laws, the grounds for
the exemption may be statutory — derived from express provisions in federal
statutes, 9
 or nonstatutory — derived from the judiciary's interpretation of
Congress' implied intent in the labor laws." The most recent Supreme Court
decision considering labor's nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws is
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100." The union in Connell, Local 100,
represented employees of mechanical subcontractors in the construction in-
dustry) 2
 Local 100 had forced Connell Company (Connell), a general contrac-
tor, to agree that it would not award contracts to mechanical subcontractors
who had not signed a collective bargaining agreement with Local 100) 3 Con-
nell brought suit in federal court, charging that the agreement violated sections
Therefore, even though "indirect" restraints resulted from the union's activity, id, at 510-11, the
Sherman Act was not meant to prohibit a union's attempts to eliminate price competition based
on differences in labor standards. Id. at 503-04. Thus, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
Sherman Act to cases in which "local strikes conducted by illegal means in a production industry
prevented interstate shipment of substantial amounts of the product, but in which it was not
shown that the restrictions on shipments had operated to restrain commercial competition in
some substantial way." Id. 496-97.
A year later, in United States v, Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Court dismissed
criminal charges brought under the Sherman Act against individual leaders of a union who called
a strike against a brewery because of a dispute between their union and another union concern-
ing work jurisdiction at the brewery's facility. The Court approached the labor/antitrust problem
in a different manner than in Apex. Instead of interpreting the Sherman Act as having a limited
scope, the Court read the Sherman Act, together with the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts,
"as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct." Id. at 231. Thus, where application of the
Sherman Act to labor activity was inconsistent with the provisions of the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts, the union would be exempt from antitrust prohibitions. Id. at 232.
6 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 809-10 (1945).
Id. at 809.
8 Id. at 806. "We must determine how far Congress intended activities under one of
these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other." Id.
9 In particular, $5 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 17 (1976) and 29 U.S.C.
5 52 (1976), and $5 4, 5, and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 55 104, 105, and 113
(1976).
10 "[The Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts] do not exempt concerted action or
agreements between unions and nonlabor parties. Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
662 (1965). The Court has recognized, however, that a proper accommodation between the con-
gressional policy favoring collective bargaining . . . and the congressional policy favoring free,
competition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a
limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions. Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676 (1965)." Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
" 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
12 Id. at 619.
t8 Id. at 619-21.
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1 and 2 of the Sherman Act." After a trial on the merits," the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that because the sub-
contracting agreement was authorized by section 8(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)," it was exempt from the antitrust laws.° The Connell
agreement clearly violated the general language of section 8(e) because it was a
"hot cargo" agreement, that is, an agreement by an employer not to do busi-
ness with another employer." Nevertheless, the District Court found that the
agreement was protected by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e),
which allows hot cargo agreements concerning work "to be done at the job-
site" in the construction industry."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding that the agreement was exempt from the antitrust laws
without deciding whether the agreement was protected by the construction in-
dustry proviso of section 8(e) of the NLRA. 2° The Supreme Court reversed on
the question of federal antitrust immunity." In holding that the agreement was
" Id. at 620-21. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1976), reads in pertinent
part: ' 'Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared illegal . . " Section 2, 15 U.S.C. 5 2 (1976),
provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several United States . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . "
15 Connell Construction Co. v, Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R. M. 3012, 3014 (N.D.
Tex. 1971).
16 29 U.S.C. S 158(e) (1976). Section 8(e) of the NLRA provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement en-
tered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be such ex-
tent unenforceable and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall ap-
ply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the con-
struction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done
at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, struc-
ture, or other work . . .
29 U. S.C. 5 158(e) (1976).
" 78 L.R.R.M. at 3015.
La Ste National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634-39
(1967) for a discussion of the legislative history of S 8(e),
19 78 L.R.R.M. At 3014. See note 16 supra for the text of 8(e).
" Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1175 (5th Cir.
1973). The circuit court believed that it was actually confronted with a labor law controversy
rather than an antitrust controversy. Id. at 1171. The court found that the Local 100 was pursu-
ing a legitimate union interest regardless of whether the subcontracting clause violated 5 8(e). Id.
at 1167. Since there was no evidence of an anticompetitive conspiracy other than one in which
Connell itself would have been a conspirator, id. at 1165-66, the court maintained that Connell's
complaint exclusively involved labor issues which should initially be decided by the NLRB. Id. at
1174.
21 421 U.S. at 621.
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not exempt from the antitrust laws," the Court first used a method of analysis
which focused on the nature, effect, and magnitude of the alleged restraint
caused by the agreement." It then found that the subcontracting agreement
did in fact violate section 8(e) of the NLRA because it did not come within the
protection of the construction industry proviso. 24
The Connell majority was criticized for not adequately protecting labor ac-
tivity from antitrust regulation." In two important respects, however, the facts
of Connell are unlike those of previous labor/antitrust cases decided by the
Supreme Court. First, the subcontracting agreement in Connell was not part of
a collective bargaining agreement. In fact, Local 100 expressly indicated in the
agreement that it had no desire to represent Connell's employees. 26 Second,
the Connell Court held that the subcontracting agreement, a method used by
Local 100 to organize subcontractors, was illegal because it was a "hot cargo"
agreement violating section 8(e) of the NLRA." Because of these distinguish-
ing factors, some commentators predicted that the Connell decision would not
significantly change the law regarding the labor exemption from the antitrust
laws." Essentially, their prediction was correct.
This note will analyze the effect the Connell decision has had on labor exemp-
tion cases where provisions in collective bargaining agreements are alleged to
violate the antitrust laws. First, the scope of the nonstatutory exemption as it
existed before Connell will be defined. The Connell case itself will then be dis-
cussed. Consideration will be given to how the Connell decision may potentially
have affected the scope of the nonstatutory exemption. Next, this note will
focus on lower court decisions that have interpreted Connell. This section will
initially discuss cases in which collective bargaining provisions not otherwise il-
legal are alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will then consider cases in
which illegal collective bargaining provisions are alleged to violate the antitrust
laws. It will be submitted that the Connell analysis should not apply where legal
22 Id. at 635. The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the agreement,
in fact, violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 637.	 .
23 Id. at 623-25. See text and notes at notes 97-105 infra.
24 421 U.S. at 633.
" See, e.g., Bartosic, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: The Allocation of Power in Deciding
Labor Law Policy, 62 VA. L. REV. 533, 601 (1976); St. Antoine, Connell, supra note 5, at 622; Note,
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 243-44 (1975); Note, Labor's Exemption after
Connell, 36 OHIO ST. L. J. 852, 867 (1975); Note, Diminution of Labor's Immunity Under the Antitrust
Law, 21 LOY. L. REV. 980, 993 (1975). But seeJanofsky & Hay, Connell — Consistent with Past,
Indicative of Future, 29th Annual N.Y.U. Conf. on Labor 3 (1976).
" "WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agreement the contractor does not grant,
nor does the union seek, recognition as the collective bargaining representative of any employees
of the signatory contractor . ." 421 U.S. at 620 (quoting from the Connell/Local 100 sub-
contracting agreement).
27 Id. at 633.
28 St. Antoine, Connell, supra note 5, at 628; GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
UNIONIZATION, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 635 (1976); Note, Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers Local 100: New Limits on Labor's Antitrust Immunity?, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 536, 550
(1976).
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collective bargaining provisions are at issue. Instead, when a signatory to a
legal collective bargaining agreement brings an antitrust action, the agreement
should be exempt from the antitrust laws if arm's-length bargaining preceded
its signing. Further, when a nonsignatory brings an antitrust suit regarding a
legal collective bargaining agreement, pre-Connell analysis should be utilized.
Finally, it will be submitted that where a collective bargaining provision is il-
legal under the labor laws, a "foreseeability" test should be included in any
method of analysis which the court utilizes.
I. EXEMPTION OF LABOR ACTIVITIES FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
PRE-CONNELL
There are two distinct branches of the labor exemption from the antitrust
laws — the statutory exemption and the nonstatutory exemption. 29 In both
branches the . judiciary must reconcile congressional labor and antitrust policies
by determining whether Congress intended its labor policy or its antitrust
policy to prevail in a given situation. 3° Although the two branches have a
similar function, the statutory exemption is derived from the specific terms of
the Clayton 3 ' and Norris-LaGuardia 32 Acts while the nonstatutory exemption
is a judicial doctrine. To understand fully the development of the nonstatutory
exemption, a cursory examination of the statutory exemption is helpful.
The statutory exemption of labor activities from antitrust prohibitions is
concerned only with unilateral union activity — that is, those situations in
29 The existence of the nonstatutory exemption was first expressly acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in Connell Construction Co. v, Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). "The
Court has recognized . . that a proper accommodation between the congressional policy
favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free com-
petition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a
limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions." Id. at 622. The terms "statutory"
and "nonstatutory" are somewhat misleading since all exemption decisions support to accom-
modate the Labor Act with the Sherman Act. Comment, The Supreme Court, 1974, Term, HARV,
L. REV. 47, 236 n.13 (1975).
'° See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945). Where the statu-
tory exemption from the antitrust laws might apply, the Court purports to carry out Congress'
express intention. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.. 219, 231 (1941). In nonstatutory
exemption cases, the Court must recognize Congress' implied intention. See Connell, 421 U.S. at
622-23.
3 ' See note 4 supra.
" Section 4, 5, and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 104, 105, and 113
(1976) are the applicable provisions. Section 4 prohibits any court from issuing a restraining
order or an injunction for certain listed activities if they arise out of a labor dispute. Section 5 pro-
vides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons partic-
ipating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful
combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts enumerated
in section 4 of this Act.
29 U.S.C. 105 (1976). Section 13 broadly defines the term "labor dispute." See KHEEL, supra
note 4, §§ 4.04-4.05 (1980).
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which no agreement, combination, or conspiracy exists between a union and a
nonlabor group. 33 The statutory exemption is derived from sections 6 and 20 of
the Clayton Act, 34 and from the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Congress expressly
intended that these provisions should override the provisions of all other laws. 36
The Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, when read together with the Sher-
man Act as a "harmonizing text,"" exempt from antitrust scrutiny unilateral
union activity that is not subject to a restraining order or injunction under the
express terms of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. 38 The statutory ex-
emption thus primarily serves to protect a union from the antitrust laws when it
attempts to organize unilaterally or to gain employer recognition by using legal
methods." Some of these legal methods include: refusing to work, becoming a
member of a union, paying strike or unemployment benefits, aiding persons
involved in a labor dispute by all lawful means, and advertising for outside
support in a labor dispute. 1 °
33 In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) the Court stated:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 (of the Clayton Act) are not to be distin-
guished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union
activities are the means.
Id. at 232.
Later, in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), the Court held that
the statutory exemption would not protect a union when it combined with a nonlabor group. Id.
at 810. The defendant union in that case sought to obtain higher wages and better working condi-
tions for its members. Id. at 799. The union succeeded in achieving its goals through collective
bargaining, but in so doing it also joined with employers in a conspiracy to fix prices and to
monopolize a particular product market. Id. at 800. Because the union had joined in an em-
ployer's conspiracy, the Court held that it should not be exempt from the antitrust laws. Id.
809-10. "Our holding means that the same labor union activity may or may not be in violation of
the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups." Id. at 810. Thus, even though the union sought to achieve legitimate labor goals — bet-
ter wages, hours and working conditions — it could not do so by aiding businessmen in a conspir-
acy which, absent union involvement, violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 808. Excellent treatments
of the labor exemption prior to the Supreme Court's development of the nonstatutory exemption
from the antitrust laws are: Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws — A Preliminary Analysis, 404 U. PA.
L. REV. 252 (1955); Smith, Antitrust and Labor, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1119 (1955); Sovern, Some
Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13 LAB. L. J. 957, (1962); Winter,
Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE
L. J. 14 (1963).
3*
 See note 4 supra.
33 See note 32 supra.
36 See notes 4 and 32 supra.
37 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231. Curiously, the Wagner Act, 49 Stat.
449 (1935), was not included by Justice Frankfurter in the Hutcheson opinion as one of the Acts -
which should be read together with the Sherman Act in determining the availability of the labor
exemption from the antitrust laws.
39 See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232; United Mine Workers v. Penn-
ington, 381 U.S. 657, 661-62 (1965); St. Antoine, Secondary Boycott: From Antitrust to Labor Rela-
tions, 40 ANTITRUST L. J. 242, 245 (1971) [hereinafter cited as St. Antoine, Secondary Boycott].
39 See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232 (1941); St. Antoine, Secondary Boy-
cott, supra note 38, at 245.
4° See 29 U.S.C. 104 (1976).
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Today unions seldom rely on the protection of the statutory exemption from
the antitrust laws.'" Once a union has passed the organizational stage of its de-
velopment, it generally can persuade recalcitrant employers by utilizing its
bargaining power without resorting to unilateral concerted activity.'" For ex-
ample, unions may occasionally attempt to expand their control in industries
that have resisted traditional unilateral organizing methods by using collective
bargaining agreements to force "top down" organizing of nonunion
employers. 43 The unions are no longer entitled to the protection of the statutory
exemption, however, when they have executed a collective bargaining agree-
ment with a nonlabor group."
While the statutory exemption, based on the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts, is rarely invoked by the unions, the nonstatutory exemption
from the antitrust laws is more widely utilized. The nonstatutory exemption is
derived from the congressional policy underlying the Wagner Act,'" the Taft-
Hartley Act, 46 and the Landrum-Griffin Amendments,'" which together form
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 48 and the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). 49 Congress intended the LMRA and NLRA to pro-
41 St. Antoine, Secondary Boycott, supra note 38, at 255.
" Union signatory clauses or work preservation clauses, for example, are used to pre-
vent nonunion workers from obtaining jobs traditionally held by union workers. N.L.R.B. v. In-
ternational Longshoremen's Ass' n, 100 S. Ct. 2305, 2314 (1980).
* 3 A clause which violates S 8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(e) (1976), see note 90
infra, may allow a union to organize without making a "grass roots" effort to obtain members us-
ing traditional means. In Connell, the Court noted that Congress intended the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments to the NLRA to limit the use of "top down" organizing campaigns. 421 U.S. at
632.
44 See note 30 supra. Another reason for the limited utility of the statutory exemption
derives from the Supreme Court's narrow definition of "unilateral" union activity. Generally it
can be assumed that, during collective bargaining, an employer strongly resists each concession a
union receives — the union and the employer do not normally act in concert at the negotiating
table. Nevertheless, once the union and the employer have reached an agreement, the Supreme
Court considers that the union has acted in combination with a nonlabor group, and it will not
apply the nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws. See Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1975); Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 688-89 (1965); Leslie, Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts and Labor Antitrust, 89
HARV. L. REV. 904, 914-15 (1976); 710. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATIONS 5 48.03(1) (1979).
The Supreme Court may further limit the scope of its definition of unilateral union ac-
tivity when it decides H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 622 F.2d 647 (2d
Cir. 1980) cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3372 (No. 80-348). In that case, the Second Circuit applied
the statutory exemption from the antitrust laws because franchising agreements signed between
theatrical agents and a theatrical union were deemed to constitute unilateral union activity since
the agents were members of the theatrical union. 622 F.2d at 650. See American Federation of
Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1967) (a case in which the statutory exemption from the anti-
trust laws was applied to similar facts).
" 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
" 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
" 73 Stat. 541 (1959).
" 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended by 29 U.S.C. 55 141-197 (1976).
49 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 29 U.S.C. 55 151-169 (1976).
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mote stable relations between employees and employers" by encouraging the
collective bargaining process. 5 ' Therefore, the most important factor con-
sidered by courts in determining whether to allow the nonstatutory exemption
is the extent to which the collective bargaining process may be adversely af-
fected by the antitrust suit." Because the congressional policy favoring collec-
" The stated purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act is:
to promote the full flow of commerce to prescribe the legitimate rights of both em-
ployees and employers . . . to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for pre-
venting the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect
the rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their rela-
tions with labor organizations . , to define and proscribe practices on the part
of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general
welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes af-
fecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. 5 141 (1976).
." The Wagner Act declares that it is the "policy of the United States to eliminate . . .
substantial obstructions- to the free flow of commerce . . by encouraging the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associ-
ation . . . for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment. .
29 U.S.C. $ 151 (1976). The Supreme Court has commented that:
The goal of federal labor policy, as expressed in the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts, is the promotion of collective bargaining; to encourage the employer and the
representative of the employees to establish, through collective negotiation, their
own charter for the ordering of industrial relations, and thereby to minimize in-
dustrial strife. Within the area in which collective bargaining was required, Con-
gress was not concerned with the substantive terms upon which the parties agreed.
Local 24, Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959) (citations omitted).
" United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). "[W]e are concerned
here with harmonizing the Sherman Act with the national policy expressed in the National Labor
Relations Act of promoting 'the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-
management controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation,' Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. Labor Board, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964)." Id. at 665. The Court in Connell Construc-
tion Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) stated: "The Court has recognized
. . . that a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective bargain-
ing under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets
requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption
from antitrust sanctions." Id. at 622. See also Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,
611-12 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (197'7); Mann, Powers & Roberts, The Accom-
modation Between Antitrust and Labor Laws: The Antitrust Labor Exemption, 9 SETON HALL L. REV.
744, 748 (1978); KHEEL, supra note 4 5 4.06[1lleifil (1980).
It has been argued, however, that the Supreme Court intended the nonstatutory ex-
emption from the antitrust laws to promote two congressional labor interests — (1) the interest in
promoting industrial peace through collective bargaining, and (2) the interest in advancing union
interests — but that the lower courts have begun to recognize that the primary interest to be pro-
tected by the nonstatutory exemption is that of collective bargaining. Casenote, Labor Exemption to
the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitive Provision Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest:
McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C. L. REV. 680, 695, 712.14 (1980).
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the Supreme Court has always recognized that the non-
statutory exemption from the antitrust laws was intended primarily to protect the collective bar-
gaining process developed by Congress in the NLRA. The major issue in the Supreme Court's
nonstatutory exemption cases has not concerned whether a policy of advancing labor interests or
a policy of promoting collective bargaining is to be protected. Rather, the controversy has
centered on the question of how much protection Congress intended the collective bargaining
process to have. For example, Justice Goldberg, concurring in the judgment of Local 189,
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tive bargaining was intended to promote industrial peace rather than to further
union interests the nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws may be as-
serted by employers as well as by unions. 53
Before Connell, the parameters of the nonstatutory exemption were loosely
drawn in two cases that were decided by the United States Supreme Court on
the same day, Meat Cutters a. jewel Tea Co." and United Mine Workers a. Penning-
ton." In Jewel Tea, the Court recognized a nonstatutory exemption by holding
that in a case where the statutory exemption does not apply, a union might still
be exempt from the antitrust laws. jewel Tea Co. had signed, under duress, 56 a
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by representatives of a group of
meat retailers, of which jewel was a member, and the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of America, AFL-CIO." jewel then brought
suit against the unions, charging that a marketing hours restriction in the
agreement preventing the sale of meat during certain hours violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act." The federal district court found that because there
was no evidence of an anticompetitive conspiracy between the union and the
retailers against jewel," the marketing-hours restriction was exempt from the
antitrust laws." Although the appeals court did not disturb the district court's
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and dissenting in United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), would have held that Congress intended "all
collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Labor Act"
to be exempt from the antitrust laws. 381 U.S. at 709-10. Justice White, however, writing the
plurality opinion of the Court for both cases, determined that the collective bargaining process
should have a lesser degree of protection. See text and notes at notes 64-80 infra.
" Only labor activity is protected by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. See text
and notes at notes 29-40 supra; see also Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River and
Indiana Railroad, 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957); but see KHEEL, supra note 4, 5 4.01(4) (1980) (arguing
that the statutory exemption may be available to management as well). The statutory exemption
is therefore available only to labor groups. See Calif. State Council of Carpenters v. Ass'n Gen.
Contractors of Calif., Inc., 105 L.R.R.M. 3311, 3316-17 (9th Cir. 1980), The LMRA and the
NLRA, however, were intended to favor neither unions nor employers. In these acts Congress
intended to create an impartial atmosphere that would foster the peaceful settlement of labor
disputes. Ste 29 U.S.C. 5 141 (1976). Consequently, the courts have recognized that the nonsta-
tutory exemption should be available to employers. Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Krafto Corp., 494
F.2d 840, 847, n. 14 (3d Cir. 1974) (dicta); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,
612 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); 71 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS S 48.03(3) (1979) [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKI].
In McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979), an employer was
successful in asserting the exemption defense. Id. at 1203. See text and notes at notes 121-28
infra.
" 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
33
 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See generally Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and
Jewel Tea, 46 B.U. L. REV. 317 (1966); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the An-
titrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1965).
66 381 U.S. at 681.
" id. at 680.
" Id. at 681.
59 215 F. Supp. 839, 845 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
60 Id. at 848. The court found that the marketing hours restriction was exempt from an-
titrust scrutiny because it exclusively served the union's interests, id. at 846, and because the
union's goals of protecting work and job security were legitimate. Id. at 848.
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finding of no conspiracy,`'[ it nevertheless ruled that the agreement violated the
antitrust laws." Thus when the case reached the Supreme Court, the question
was whether the collective bargaining agreement, by itself, could be held to
violate the antitrust laws. 63 Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court,"
found first that the marketing-hours restriction was "intimately related to
wages, hours and working conditions," 65 because it constituted a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining under section 8(d) of the NLRA. 66 In addition,
he determined that the restriction was obtained "through bona fide,
arm's-length bargaining. " 67
 Finally, Justice White found that the unions had
sought the restrictions "in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at
the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups." 68 He concluded that
where these three criteria are met, the unions should be protected by the "na-
tional labor policy" and exempted from the Sherman Act. 69 The test developed
in Jewel Tea — that a provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement
is exempt from antitrust scrutiny if it concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, is the product of a bona fide arm's-length bargaining, and is not
entered into at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups — is
known as the intimately related test. 7 °
While in Jewel Tea a collective bargaining provision was exempted from
antitrust scrutiny, in Pennington, wage scale provisions in a collective bargain-
°' See 381 U.S. at 688.
" 331 F.2d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 1964). The court found that ,Jewel's complaint had suffi-
ciently alleged an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 550. In addition, the court concluded
that the contract or combination which contained the marketing-hours restriction constituted a
conspiracy, even though no independent evidence of an anticompetitive intent to injure Jewel's
business had been presented. Id. at 551. In effect, the court considered the terms, "contract,"
"combination," and "conspiracy" to be interchangeable. Id.
" 381 U.S. at 688. Had there been independent evidence of a conspiracy, the holding
of Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), would have been controlling, and
the agreement would have been nonexempt. See note 4 supra.
" The Justices divided into three groups of three in,fewel Tea, Justice White, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Douglas,
joined by Justices Black and Clark, wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Goldberg, joined by
Justices Harlan and Stewart, wrote a concurring opinion. Justice White's opinion in Jewel lea,
which defines the exemption in narrower terms than the Goldberg opinion, has been regarded as
.containing the authoritative holding of that case.
65
 381 U.S. at 689-90.
66 Id. at 691. Under section 8(d) of the NLRA, employers' and employees' representa-
tives are required to bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
67 381 U.S. at 689-90.
65 Id.
69 Id.
7° See Note, Labor Law — Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions — Connell Construction Co.
v. Plumbers Local 100, 17 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. REV. 217, 225 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
B.C. Note]; Comment, Connell: Broadening Labor's Antitrust Immunity While Narrowing Its Construc-
tion Industry Proviso Protection, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 305, 320 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cath. U.
Comment].
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ing agreement, clearly mandatory bargaining subjects,n were held to be non-
exempt." A small coal operator contended in Pennington that the United Mine
Workers (UMW) had entered into a conspiracy with the large coal operators to
impose the wage and royalty scales contained in its collective bargaining agree-
ment on nonunion coal operators." The alleged purpose of this conspiracy was
to eliminate the small coal operators from the market by forcing them to pay
wage scales that they could not afford. 74 After a full trial, a jury rendered a ver-
dict for the small coal operator which was subsequently affirmed by the court of
appeals. 75
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded because of errors in the ad-
mission of evidence. 76 A majority of the Court found, however, that the union
was not exempt from the antitrust laws." According to Justice White, author
of the Court's opinion, the wage and royalty scales contained in the collective
bargaining agreement, by themselves, would have been exempt from antitrust
sanctions had the union sought to impose them on employers unilaterally, as a
matter of its own policy. 78 The small coal operator alleged, however, that the
union had agreed with the large coal operators to impose the restrictive scales
on competing employers." The union was therefore not exempt from the anti-
7 ' 381 U.S. at 774 (Goldberg, j., dissenting).
77 U. at 669.
" /d. at 659-60. The suit was initiated by the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund to
collect royalty payments owned by the small coal operator. Id. at 659. The small coal operator
filed a counterclaim against the trustees of the fund, the UMW, and certain large coal operators
which alleged that the collective bargaining agreement that required them to pay into the retire-
ment fund violated the Sherman Act. Id.
74 /d. at 660. The counterclaim alleged that in addition to negotiating a collective
bargaining agreement in 1950, the UMW and the large coal operators tacitly agreed to eliminate
overproduction in the coal industry by forcing the small coal operators out of business. Id. In
return for a promise of high wage and royalty payments, the UMW allegedly agreed (I) to aban-
don its attempts to set the working time of its members, (2) to allow rapid mechanization of the
coal mines, and (3) to impose the terms of the collective bargaining agreement on the small coal
operators without regard to their ability to pay. Id.
" 325 F.2d 804, 817 (6th Cir. 1963).
76 381 U.S. at 669-72.
77 As in jewel Tea, the ,Justices divided into three groups of three in Pennington. Justice
White, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, again wrote the opinion of the
court. ,Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark, wrote a concurring opinion. Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Jewel Tea served also as the dissenting opinion in Pennington,
While Justice White's, Jewel Tea opinion has been regarded as containing the authoritative hold-
ing of that case, lower courts consistently have regarded Justice White's opinion in Pennington,
read in conjunction with Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, to contain the authoritative
holding of that case. See, e.g., Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 620 F.2d 416, 428
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 207 (1980); Consol. Exp. Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602
F.2d 494, 516 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 100 S. Ct. 3040 (1980). See also
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 720-21
(1965); Cox, Labor and Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U. L. REV. 317, 323
(1966).
381 U.S. at 664, 665 n.2.
" Id. at 665.
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trust laws under Jewel Tea's intimately related test. In addition to executing a
collective bargaining agreement with the large coal operators, the union agreed
to impose the terms of its collective bargaining agreement on the small coal
operators, and it allegedly did so at the behest of or in combination with large
coal operators who were seeking to eliminate the small coal operators. 8°
The intimately related test, formulated in jewel Tea and Pennington, was in-
tended for use in cases where provisions in collective bargaining agreements
are alleged to violate the antitrust laws. This does not mean, however, that the
intimately related test has provided a clear standard for the lower courts to ap-
ply in such cases. On the contrary, the test is somewhat vague and difficult to
interpret. 8 ' The primary difficulty encountered by the lower courts concerns
the meaning of the Court's requirement that a union may not enter into an
agreement at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups. 82 In Penn-
ington, for example, the Court may have meant that a union forfeits its exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws whenever it surrenders, in a collective bargaining
agreement with one group of employers, its freedom to negotiate different
terms with another group of employers." Yet the generally accepted interpre-
tation of the Court's meaning in Pennington is that while a union might sur-
render its freedom to bargain on its own initiative, it may not agree with one
group of employers to impose certain terms on a competing group of em-
ployers." A second difficulty in utilizing the intimately related test has yet to be
" Id. at 667-69.
al P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 1 ANTITRUST LAW § 229 (1978). Much of this difficulty
stems from the fact that both Jewel Tea and Pennington were plurality decisions. See notes 64 and
77 supra.
" The lower courts therefore have had no instruction from the Supreme Court on how
much evidence, if any, must be presented before a showing has been made that an agreement
should be nonexempt because it was entered into at the behest of nonlabor groups. Once the ex-
emption question has been settled, however, the lower courts have been given some guidance
from the Supreme Court concerning the standard of proof required to show that an antitrust
violation has occurred. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971) (the ordinary
predominance-of-the-evidence standard is applicable to unions). See also South-East Coal Co. v.
Consolidated Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970); Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross
Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974); Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
620 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 207 (1980). It is interesting to note that
. ultimately, it was found that the union in Pennington had not violated the antitrust laws. Lewis v.
Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 818 (6th Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968).
83 See 381 U.S. at 667.
84 See id. at 665-66. This interpretation regards Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in
Pennington as a proper summarization of Justice White's opinion. Authority cited at note 77 supra
supports this interpretation. Under this interpretation, evidence of a conspiracy between the
union and a nonlabor group, or at least evidence of some sort of anticompetitive agreement in-
dependent from the collective bargaining agreement, must be shown.
The Pennington majority (including Justice Douglas), would, . . deny an ex-
emption for (I) an explicit agreement by a union with one or more employers to
impose the same wage on rival employers, (2) regardless of the latter's ability to
pay or other extreme circumstances, (3) regardless of the union's self interest, and
(4) for the purpose of destroying those other firms. How much less than this would
be condemned was left unclear by the Supreme Court . . . . Even if there were
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addressed by the courts. By stating in Jewel Tea that agreements concerning
mandatory bargaining subjects often may fall under the protection of the non-
statutory exemption from the antitrust laws, the Court seemed to infer that
agreements concerning nonmandatory bargaining subjects should always be
open to antitrust attack. It is unclear, however, if the Court fully considered
whether the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining would be com-
promised if the mandatory bargaining requirement were imposed in all labor/
antitrust cases.
Given these difficulties, it was hoped that in a subsequent decision the
Court would provide more precise guidelines for application of Jewel Tea's in-
timately related test. This hope was not realized in the recent decision of Connell
Construction Co. a. Plumbers Local 100, 85 however, where the Court applied a dif-
ferent kind of analysis — its natural effects analysis."
II. THE CONNELL DECISION
In Connell, Local 100, the defendant union, asked Connell Construction
Company, a general contractor, to sign a "hot cargo" agreement which pro-
vided that Connell would subcontract only to mechanical subcontractors who
had signed a collective bargaining agreement with Local 100. 87 When Connell
refused to sign the agreement, Local 100 picketed Connell's construction site."
an agreement, moreover, it should not be considered improper unless the second
or fourth elements are present. Pennington does not compel a contrary conclusion.
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, I ANTITRUST LAW 229, at 211 (1978).
"." 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
"" In general, the lower courts have avoided discussion in detail whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Connell has merely modified the intimately related test, or whether it has re-
placed it entirely. In Consul, Exp., Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979)
vacated on other grounds, 100 S. Ct. 3040 (1980), the Court Of Appeals for the Third Circuit com-
mented that the tests advanced in Jewel Tea and Connell are similar. Id. at 517-18. Some commen-
tators have regarded the natural effects test to be merely a modification of the intimately related
test. See, e.g., Comment, Connell: Broadening Labor's Antitrust Immunity While Narrowing its Con-
struction Industry Proviso Protection, 27 CA'I'N. U.L. REV. 305. 320-22 (1978); Note, The Supreme
Court, 1.974 Term, 89 HARV. L. Ryv. 47, 242-43 (1975); Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust
Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitive Provision Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest: McCourt
v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C. L. REV. 680, 695 (1980). At least one commentator has
argued that the natural effects test supplants the intimately related test. Note, Labor Law — An-
titrust Liability of Labor Unions — Connell, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 217, 224-25 (1976).
It is contended in this note that the natural effects test may be fundamentally different
from the intimately related test. A court applying the natural effects test could find that an agree-
ment is not exempt because of the severity of the restraint which it imposes without fully con-
sidering the extent to which the agreement should be protected by the congressional policy favor-
ing collective bargaining. A court applying the intimately related test, however, must consider
the extent to which an agreement should be protected by the congressional policy favoring collec-
tive bargaining, since it must determine whether an agreement concerns a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, and whether the agreement was the product of bona fide arm's-length col-
lective bargaining.
87 421 U.S. at 619-20.
" Id. at 620.
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Connell then signed the agreement under protest and brought suit to have the
agreement declared invalid because it violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act . 89
Local 100 defended against the claim on two grounds. First, it argued that its
agreement with Connell was authorized under the construction industry pro-
viso of section 8(e) of the NLRA." If this argument were accepted, the union
urged that the agreement would be exempt, since Congress probably intended
that an agreement expressly authorized under the NLRA should not be held to
violate any other laws. 9 ' Alternatively, Local 100 argued that even if the agree-
ment violated section 8(e), it was exempt from the Sherman Act because Con-
gress intended that where an activity is expressly prohibited by the labor laws,
the labor laws should provide the exclusive remedy. 92
After considering the contentions of Local 100, the Supreme Court held,
in a 5-4 decision, 93
 that Local 100 was not exempt from the Sherman Act. The
Court remanded the case for consideration of Connell's antitrust claim on the
merits. 94 In additiorf, the majority held that the agreement violated section 8(e)
of the NLRA because it was not contained in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and "possibly" because it was not expressly limited to "common-situs
H" Id. at 620-21. Connell also brought suit under Texas' antitrust laws. The Court held
that federal law pre-empted state antitrust law where federal labor policy was in question, and
dismissed the state antitrust claims. Id. at 635-36.
Respondent's Brief on the. Merits on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, at 11-32 Thereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief].
91 Respondent's Brief, at 29-32. Local 100 relied on Seventh Circuit's decision in
Suburban Title v. ROckford Building Trades Council, 354 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 960 (1966) to support this contention. Since a valid construction subcontracting agreement
had been hekl to concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, Orange Belt District
Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1964), and since economic
action to secure such agreements had been upheld, Essex County and Vicinity District Council of
Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 641 (3d Cir. 1964). the Seventh Circuit found that "it
would be unreasonable to hold that success in securing such an agreement constitutes a violation
of the anti-trust Jaws." 354 F.2d at 3. The lower courts have continued to accept the proposition
that a clause which does not violate section 8(e) is exempt from the antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3493 (1981); Landscape Specialities, Inc. v. Laborers' Local 806, 477 F.
Supp. 17, 19 (C.D. Cal. 1979). But see Barabas v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 765
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). An agreement which is not prohibited by § 8(c), however, might be subject to
antitrust scrutiny if it is alleged that the agreement was part of a conspiracy between the signa-
tories to force competitors out of business. See United Mini: Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965).
" Respondent's Brief, at 32-43. Local 100 argued that Congress intended that the
labor laws should provide the exclusive remedy for an 8(e) violation because Congress rejected
amendments calling for the inclusion of language in the LMRA which would allow an antitrust
remedy.
93 Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the majority, in which Chief Justice Burger and
justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined. ,Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined. Justice Douglas also filed a separate dis-
senting opinion.
94 421 U.S. at 637.
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relationships on particular jobsites as well."" The majority found no
legislative history suggesting that Congress intended the labor laws to provide
the exclusive remedy for a section 8(e) violation." Local 100 had failed to per-
suade the majority to accept its arguments.
In determining whether the agreement would be exempt from the Sher-
man Act, the Connell Court developed a method of analysis which examined the
nature, effect, and magnitude of the alleged restraint. Under the Court's
natural effects analysis, 97 the agreement in Connell was not exempt from the
Sherman Act because it imposed a "direct restraint on the business market
[having] substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential, that
would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and
working conditions." 99 In deciding that the agreement at issue imposed a
direct restraint, the majority noticed that there was a separate collective bar-
gaining agreement signed by Connell and the mechanical subcontractors which
contained a most favored nation clause. 99 This clause had the "primary effect"
of preventing the union from offering any outside employers a more favorable
contract.'°° Moreover, the agreement between Local 100 and Connell pro-
95 Id. at 633. See note 16 supra for the text of section 8(e).
96 Id. at 634. Justice Stewart argued forcefully in his dissenting opinion that the legisla-
tive history showed Congress intended the exclusive remedy for all illegal secondary boycott ac-
tivity to be provided by the labor laws. Id. at 654-55.
97 The method of analysis adopted by the Court in Connell has previously been referred
to as the natural effects test. See B.C. Note, supra note 65, at 225; Cath. U. Comment, .supra note
65, at 320.
" 421 U.S. at 625.
99 Id. at 619 and 623-24. In a most favored nation clause, a union guarantees that if it
grants a more favorable contract to an employer outside the multi-employer group that
negotiated the original collective bargaining agreement, it will grant the same favorable terms to
members of the multi-employer group. Note, Antitrust Law — Most Favored Nation Clause and
Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 191 PUB. LAW 399, 399 n.4 (1970).
100 The Court hinted that the most favored nation clause in the collective bargaining
agreement between Local 100 and the mechanical subcontractors would not have been exempt,
had it been the subject of an antitrust attack, since the Court found that the primary effect of the
clause was to restrict the freedom of the union to negotiate by inhibiting it from offering other
employees a more favorable contract. Id. at 623 n.1 and 623-24. The Court noted that a Local
100 official had admitted during the trial that, because of the most favored nation clause, Local
100 would not negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with an employer containing terms
more favorable than those in the existing agreement. Id. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 53,
48.03(2) (1979).
Prior to the Connell decision the courts and the NLRB maintained that a most favored
nation clause would violate the antitrust laws only if it could be shown that the employer insisted
upon the inclusion of such a clause for an underlying anticompetitive or "predatory" purpose.
Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, Local 753, 422 F.2d 546, 554 (7th Cir.
1970); Dolly Madison Industries, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1037-38 (1970). In Dolly Madison In-
dustries, the Board commented:
In contrast to Pennington, the MFNC provision [most favored nation clause]
upon which the Employer here insisted was manifestly not an effort to impose
wages and working conditions on other employers or employees in other bargain-
ing units but was designed only to assure that this Employer could be relieved of
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hibitcd the latter's subcontracting not only to nonunion firms, but also to union
firms not represented by Local 100. 10 ' The combination of the collective bar-
gaining agreement signed by Local 100 and the subcontractors with the Con-
nell/Local 100 "hot cargo" agreement therefore had the actual effect of shelter-
ing signatory mechanical subcontractors from competitors who had not signed
with Local 100. 102 In addition, the two agreements could cause a potential re-
straint on competition, since Local 100 could eliminate subcontractors from the
market by refusing to sign collective bargaining agreements with them. 103
These anticompetitive effects, according to the Court, "would not flow
naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working condi-
tions" t° 4 because they could restrain subcontractors who have a competitive
advantage based on efficiency as well as nonunion subcontractors who have a
competitive advantage based on the payment of substandard wages.'° 5
An important factor in the Court's decision not to exempt the Connell/
Local 100 agreement from the antitrust laws was the absence of any collective
bargaining relationship between Connell and Local 100. Local 100 admitted
that it had no interest in representing Connell's employees.'" This admission
was significant to the Court, because in Connell, as in Pennington and jewel Tea,
the labor policy which the court sought to accommodate with antitrust policy
was "the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the
NLRA." 1 ° 7 Thus, where an agreement executed in an atmosphere remote
from the collective bargaining relationship is attacked, as in Connell, the de-
fending party would have difficulty showing that such an agreement should be
protected by the congressional policy embodied in the NLRA, and consequent-
ly protected from antitrust scrutiny.
• any disadvantage that it might otherwise suffer if the Union subsequently
negotiated more favorable wage and benefit levels with other employers.
Id. at 1038. In addition, the Board found that the most favored nation clause was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Id. See generally Comment, Antitrust Law — Most Favored Nation Clause and
Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 19 J. PUB. L. 399 (1970); St. Antoine, Connell, supra note 5, at 610-12.
Subsequent to the Connell decision, the courts and the NLRB have continued to uphold
most favored nation clauses. In two district court cases decided after Connell the courts have found
that most favored nation clauses do not necessarily violate the antitrust laws, and are not
necessarily nonexempt. Signatory Negotiating Com. v. Local 9, Int'l Union of Op. Eng., 447 F.
Supp. 1384, 1391 (D. Colo. 1978); Theatre Techniques v. Local 829, 103 L.R.R.M. 2215
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). In Theatre Techniques, the court observed that a most favored nation clause that
was not used to impose conditions on noncontracting parties might be exempt. Id. at 2216. The
NLRB recently has refused to hold that a most favored nation clause which is specifically limited
to "wages, hours and working conditions" violates the antitrust laws. Hotel Employees & Bar-
tenders Union, Local 355, 245 N.L. A.B. No. 100, n.1 (1979).
10 ' Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers, Local 100, 421 U.S. at 624.
102 Id.
'°' Id. at 624-25.
104 Id. at 625.
1 °5 Id. at 623-24.
106 Id. at 620.
107 Id. at 622.
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While the Connell court specified that its natural effects analysis should ap-
ply to agreements that are not the product of collective bargaining, it left open
the question whether its analysis also should be applied to provisions contained
in collective bargaining agreements. The following amorphous and perplexing
dicta from the Connell opinion contains the only clue as to what the Court might
decide when faced with an antitrust attack on a collective bargaining agree-
ment: "There can be no argument in this case, whatever its force in other con-
texts, that a restraint of this magnitude might be entitled to an antitrust exemp-
tion if it were included in a lawful collective bargaining agreement." 108 At
most, this statement indicates that the Court would not apply the Connell stand-
ard to a case involving an attack on a collective bargaining agreement. At the
very least, it indicates that the Court is not certain that it would apply the Con-
nell standard to such a case. 1 °8
In addition to the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, a final fac-
tor significant to the Connell Court in making its decision was that the agree-
ment between Local 100 and Connell violated section 8(e) of the NLRA. The
Court observed that although the end Local 100 sought to achieve — that of
organizing nonunion subcontractors — was legal, the methods Local 100 used
to achieve that end were illegal."° The subcontracting agreement's violation of
'° 8 Id. at 625-26.
1D9 See VON KALINOWSKL, supra note 53, 5 48.03(2) (1979).
A further suggestion as to whether the Court would apply the Connell standard to a case
where a collective bargaining agreement is alleged to violate the antitrust laws is provided in
Federal Maritime Com'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40 (1978). In that case the Court
held, in a 5-3 decision, that all collective bargaining agreements negotiated in the shipping in-
dustry must be submitted to the Federal Maritime Commission for approval pursuant to 5 15 of
the Shipping Act, 39 Stat. 733 (1916) as amended, 46 U.S.C. S 814 (1976), and that the Commis-
sion could reject an agreement on the grounds that it might violate the antitrust laws. Id. at 53.
The majority stressed, however, that it was accommodating the Shipping Act and the labor laws
— not the Sherman Act and the labor laws. 435 U.S. at 63. The majority stressed further that it
was not necessary that the exemption for collective bargaining agreements submitted under the
Shipping Act be identical to the labor exemption as generally applied. Id.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. Justice Powell was
convinced that the majority's decision "undercut federal labor policy, imposing undue burden
on collective bargaining, without advancing significantly any Shipping Act objectives." Id. at 65.
Justice Powell's dissent is significant because it strongly suggests that, of the majority in Conceit,
he, at least, would have considered Local 100's exemption defense more favorably if the agree-
ment attacked in Connell had been part of a collective bargaining agreement.
In Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 99 S. Ct. 1067 (1979), a case concern-
ing an exemption from the antitrust laws other than the labor exemption, Justice Stewart, writing
for a 5-4 majority, observed: "It is well settled that exemptions to the antitrust laws are to be nar-
rowly construed," and cited Connell as one of the cases supporting his observation. Id. at 1083.
There is little reason to believe that Justice Stewart, author of the dissent in Connell, intended his
comment to have a wide-ranging effect where the labor exemption is concerned.
iu) 421 U.S. at 625. The subcontracting agreement itself was an illegal method because
it violated 5 8(e). Moreover, because the agreement violated S 8(e), Local 100 violated S 8(b)(4)
(ii)(A) by picketing Connell to force it to sign the agreement. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union to force an employer to enter into an agreement which violates
5 8(e). 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1976).
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section 8(e) thus had at least some bearing on the Court's determination that
the agreement was nonexempt."' It should be noted, however, that the ex-
istence of an 8(e) violation was not by itself the determining factor regarding
the labor exemption. Before considering this factor, the Court first decided that
the agreement was not exempt because of the nature, effect, and magnitude of
the restraint which it imposed.'" Only after denying the exemption did it hold
that the agreement violated section 8(e) and that the labor laws did not provide
the exclusive remedy for 8(e) violations." 3
In Connell, therefore, the Supreme Court was faced with a fact situation
quite different from those of Jewel Tea and Pennington. The agreement alleged to
violate the antitrust laws in Connell was not a collective bargaining agreement,
and a collective bargaining relationship did not exist between the parties to the
agreement." 4 Moreover, the method used by the union in Connell was held to
violate section 8(e) of the NLRA." 5 After Connell, it remained to be seen
whether the lower courts would restrict the use of the natural effects test to
situations where the distinguishing factors of Connell were present, or whether
they would apply the test in cases with facts resembling those of Jewel Tea or
Pennington.
III. AN EVALUATION OF CONNELL'S EFFECT ON LOWER COURT DECISIONS
The lower courts have followed the Connell decision in cases involving
agreements that are not collectively bargained. 16 They have been reluctant,
however, to apply Connell' s natural effects analysis to cases involving collective
bargaining agreements. Representative lower court cases involving antitrust
attacks on collective bargaining provisions will be evaluated here. The extent to
which the lower courts have relied, or should have relied, on Connell will be ex-
plored to determine whether the courts applied an appropriate test in specific
situations. Lower court cases concerning collective bargaining agreements can
be divided according to whether the methods used by the union or employer
were legal or illegal. When the methods used by a union or employer are legal
— when the union's methods violate no laws other than the antitrust laws —
"' Id.
112 Id.
t" Id. at 633.
11+ See id. at 620.
115 Id. at 633.
116 Where an agreement which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws is not a collective
bargaining agreement, the interest in protecting the collective bargaining process is absent.
Lower courts have considered Connell to be controlling in such cases. See, e.g., Calif. State Coun-
cil of Carpenters v. Ass'n Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc., 105 L.R.R.M. 3311 (9th Cir. 1980);
Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pennsylvania, 609 F.2d 1368 (3rd Cir. 1979); Ahemose
Constr. Co. v. Atlantic, Cape May, Etc., 493 F. Supp. 1181 (D.N.J. 1980); James Julian, Inc.
v. Raytheon Co., 105 L.R.R.M. 2741 (D. Del. 1980).
Although the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Connell that the nonstatutory ex-
emption from the antitrust laws might apply to an agreement which was not the product of collec-
tive bargaining, see Muko, 609 F.2d 1373, see also B.C. Note, supra note 65, at 224 n.58, no court
has yet allowed a party to assert successfully the nonstatutory exemption defense.
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the courts generally have refrained from using natural effects analysis,
regardless of the extent of the actual or potential anticompetitive effects of an
alleged restraint." 7 When the method used by the union or employer is illegal,
however, the courts have been more willing to apply the natural effects test to
hold that an agreement is nonexempt.'" This does not represent a significant
shift away from use of the intimately related test, however, for most such agree-
ments would be nonexempt under the intimately related test as well. "9
In Muko, a restaurant chain hired Muko, a nonunion general contractor, to construct
several restaurants. 609 F.2d at 1370-71. Two unions then passed out leaflets at the first restau-
rant which Muko had completed, asking patrons to refrain from eating at the restaurant because
Muko was paying substandard wages. Id. at 1371. Officers from the restaurant chain met with
the unions, and soon after that meeting an officer of the restaurant chain wrote to the unions ex-
pressing an intention to do business in the future with contractors approved by the unions. Id.
Muko was not asked to bid on contracts for the construction of a number of additional restau-
rants opened by the chain. Id. Muko responded by bringing an antitrust suit against the unions
and the restaurant chain. Id. at 1370.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that the jury could have found that (1)
the unions had acted in concert with a nonlabor group, the restaurant chain, (2) the agreement
between the unions and the restaurant chain imposed a "direct restraint" because it made Muko
ineligible to bid for contracts with the restaurant chain, (3) the agreement had a substantial anti-
competitive effect since Muko could show that the restaurant chain could have saved $250,000.00
by contracting with it, and (4) the agreement could have had "a potential for restraining com-
petition in the business market that would not Follow naturally from the elimination of competi-
tion over wages and working conditions," Connell, 421 U.S. at 635, because it excluded Muko
from competition even if its competitive advantage was derived from efficient operating methods
rather than from payment of substandard wages. 609 F.2c1 at 1374.
Explicitly applying its understanding of the holding of Connell — that an agreement be-
tween a union and a business organization, outside a collective bargaining relationship, which
imposes a direct restraint upon a business market, and which is not justified by congressional
labor policy because it has actual or potential anticompetitive effects that would not flow natural-
ly from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions, is not exempt from
antitrust scrutiny," id. at 1373 — the Third Circuit held that it was error for the district court to
direct a verdict for the defendants on the ground that they were exempt from the antitrust laws.
The Third Circuit might have held, however, that the defendants were exempt from the antitrust
laws if the agreement between the unions and the restaurant chain had been a collective bargain-
ing agreement. See text and notes at notes 174-206 infra.
The complaint in Calif. State Council of Carpenters was regarded by the Ninth Circuit as
presenting the "flip side" of the situation presented in Connell. Two unions alleged that an associ-
ation of general contractors and its individual members had sought to coerce owners of property
and general contractors to hire only nonunion subcontractors. 105 L.R.R.M. at 3314-15. The
defendants brought a motion to dismiss claiming that they were immune from the antitrust laws
under the nonstatutory exemption. Id. at 3315, The court noted that the unions could show that
" tin lore efficient subcontractors who had signed with the unions and were paying wage rates and
fringe benefits equal to or lower than those paid by nonunion subcontractors would be precluded
From competing for carpentry work required by those who had not signed with the Unions." Id.
Therefore, the court reasoned that the natural effects analysis of Connell could apply with equal
foice against employer groups as against unions. Id. The court denied the employers' motion to
dismiss, finding that "the nonstatutory exemption may be invoked only in cases involving agree-
ments between unions and employers on wages and working conditions." Id. at 3318. Thus, it
appears that the Ninth Circuit interpreted Connell as restricting application of the nonstatutory
exemption from the antitrust laws only to collective bargaining agreements, or the equivalent.
1 i 7 See text and notes at notes 133-74 infra.
" 8 See text and notes at notes 175-82 infra.
1 ' 9 Id,
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A. Where Collective Bargaining Provisions are Legal Under the Labor Laws
1. Action Brought by Signatory Attacking an Agreement which
Affects Only Parties to the Agreement
When an action involving a legal collective bargaining provision is
brought by a signatory to the agreement, the courts have been strongly in-
fluenced by one factor — namely, the status of the parties who must endure the
restraint allegedly caused by the provision. The lower courts generally have
recognized that the extent to which collective bargaining agreements restrain-
ing trade should be shielded from the congressional antitrust policy depends
greatly on the degree to which parties outside the collective bargaining relation-
ship are affected by the restraint.'" Consequently, when an alleged restraint
affects only parties within a collective bargaining relationship, such as the
signatory plaintiff, the lower courts have avoided making an initial inquiry into
the nature and magnitude of an alleged restraint, even though the restraint im-
posed on one of those parties may be particularly severe. The lower courts thus
have not used Connell's natural effects analysis in such cases.
An example of such a case is McCourt v. California Sports, Inc. 121 Individual
hockey players brought suit in McCourt alleging that the reserve system in the
National Hockey League violated the antitrust laws.'" Their employers de-
fended by claiming that the reserve system was exempt from antitrust scrutiny
because it was contained in a fully negotiated collective bargaining agree-
ment.'" In deciding whether the reserve system was exempt from the antitrust
laws, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not apply the
natural effects method of analysis by considering the nature, magnitude, and
effect of the restraint imposed by the reserve system. The court noted that the
reserve system had no significant anticompetitive effect on parties outside the
collective bargaining relationship. 124
 It therefore applied the relevant portions
of the intimately related tests — (1) the agreement must concern a mandatory
10 See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
121
 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). See Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding
an Anticompetitive Provision Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest: McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc., 21 B.C. L. REV. 680 (1980). Another representative case of this type is Mackey v.
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977),
discussed at note 129 infra.
122
 600 F.2d at 1196. The reserve system provided basically that if a player signs with
another team after the expiration of his contract, the new team must compensate the player's
former team, either by the assignment of contracts, the assignment of players, or the payment of
money. Id. at 1195.
123 Set id. at 1197. Employers as well as unions are entitled to involve the nonstatutory
exemption as a defense. See note 53 supra.
124
 Id. at 1198.
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subject of collective bargaining, and (2) it must be the product of bona fide
arm's length bargaining — to determine whether the reserve system was ex-
empt.' 25 The court found that the reserve system concerned a mandatory sub-
ject of collective bargaining.' 26 In addition, the court closely examined the
bargaining history of the reserve system, 127 and concluded that bona fide
bargaining had taken place. Consequently, the court held that, under the in-
timately related test, the reserve system was exempt from the antitrust laws.' 28
The lower courts have correctly recognized that application of Connell's
natural effects analysis to cases where an alleged restraint does not affect par-
ties outside the collective bargaining relationship is unwarranted.'" The prop-
er method of analysis in such situations does not call for an investigation into
the nature and magnitude of an alleged restraint. Rather, it calls for considera-
tion of whether bona fide arm's-length bargaining has occurred. As long as
bona fide bargaining has taken place, the lower courts have been willing to pro-
tect the congressional labor policy favoring collective bargaining, even though
the magnitude of the alleged restraint could be significant. No significant anti-
trust policies are furthered when a party freely negotiates and assents to a col-
lective bargaining agreement and then invokes the antitrust laws to free itself
from its contractual obligations. In addition, the collective bargaining process
125 Id. at 1197-98. There was no allegation that the reserve system did not satisfy the
third party of the intimately related test — that is, that the agreement was entered into by the
player's association at the behest of nonlabor groups for an anticompetitive purpose.
126 Id. at 1198. The court found that the reserve system was a mandatory subject of col-
lective bargaining under S 8(d) of the NLRA because it restricted the players' ability to change
teams and lowered their wages.
1 " Id. at 1199-203.
"8 Had the McCourt panel applied a broad interpretation of the natural effects test, it
might have reached a different conclusion. The court would have focused more on the nature and
effect of the restraint imposed by the reserve system. It could have found that the reserve system
imposed a substantial anticompetitive effect because it restricted the players from entering new
"markets" by changing teams, and because it prevented the poorer teams from acquiring good
players by artificially increasing the cost of recruiting them. Arguably, such a restraint does not
follow naturally from elimination of competition over wages and working conditions because of
its effect of competition based on efficiency. The court could have found that the ability of the
more "efficient" players to compete with less "efficient" players would be reduced because the
cost of obtaining "efficient" players in the open market was artificially high.
"9 Another court which has refused to apply Connell's natural effects analysis to this type
of case is the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). In Mackey, individual professional football players at-
tacked the NFL's reserve system, the so-called "Rozelle Rule." Id. at 609. In determining
whether to apply the nonstatutory exemption, the McCourt court had followed the standards
which had been set out in Mackey. Compare 600 F.2d at 1197-98 with 543 F.2d at 614-15. The
Rozelle Rule was held not to be exempt from the antitrust laws in Mackey, however, because the
court was not convinced that the Rule was the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining. 543
F.2d at 616. After the court had determined.that bona fide bargaining had not taken place, and
that the need to protect the collective bargaining process was not compelling, the court then ex-
amined the nature and magnitude of the restraint involved and held that it unreasonably
restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 622.
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would be compromised. Any provision in a valid collective bargaining agree-
ment could potentially be voided merely upon a showing that the provision im-
poses a harsh burden on one of the parties to the agreement.' 3°
2. Action Brought by Signatory Attacking Agreement which
Affects Third Parties
Occasionally, a signatory may allege that a collective bargaining agree-
ment violates the antitrust laws because it has an anticompetitive impact not
only on itself, but also on parties outside the collective bargaining relationship.
Where a restraint imposed by a collective bargaining agreement does affect
parties outside the collective bargaining relationship, the need to protect the
congressional antitrust policy increases, since a competitive economy may be
hampered by agreements restraining the competitive ability of innocent third
parties. It can be assumed that a party outside a collective bargaining relation-
ship will bring an antitrust suit if it is actually injured by the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. When a signatory to a collective bargaining agree-
ment which potentially affects third parties brings suit, generally the gravamen
of its complaint is that its freedom to deal with innocent third parties has been
restrained. Thus, whether the agreement has had an actual anticompetitive ef-
fect on parties outside the collective bargaining relationship is immaterial, so
far as application of the exemption from the antitrust laws is concerned. What
is required, however, is that the agreement does have the potential to affect
parties outside the bargaining relationship. The relationship between the par-
ties in such cases is similar to the relationship between the parties in Connell. In
that case, Connell contended that it was injured because the agreement which
it had signed inhibited its freedom to deal with innocent third parties — that is,
subcontractors who had not signed a collective bargaining agreement with
Local 100. 13 ' Despite the similarity between these cases and Connell, however,
the lower courts hearing these cases have not followed Connell. Without apply-
ing an alternative standard, they have found the agreements in question to be
exempt from antitrust scrutiny simply because the Connell decision was
distinguishable.
An example of this type of case is In re Bullard Contracting Corp.' 32 In
' 3° See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Printiplev and Collective Bargaining 1.!) , Athletes: qjSuperitars
in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971). The authors argue that individual members of a collective bar-
gaining unit should not be able to sue their employers in antitrust. Id. at 22-28. "Collective
bargaining seeks to order labor markets through a system of countervailing power. Thus, it is
often referred to by economists as a bilateral monopoly: If such a structure is to he protected by
law, then logically the antitrust claims between employers and employees roust be extin-
guished." Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted).
' 31 See Connell, 421 U.S. at 618-22. It is interesting to note that the Connell court dis-
cussed how the Connell/Local 100 agreement would impose a substantial anticompetitive effect
on hypothetical subcontractors rather than how the agreement would affect Connell Company,
the actual party bringing suit. Id. at 623-25.
L32 464 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). Another case of this type is Signatory Negotiat-
ing Com. v. Local 9, Int'l Union of Operators, 447 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1978). Signatory, like
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Bullard, as in Connell, a general contractor (Bullard) alleged that subcontracting
provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement, which it had signed
with its employees' union, violated the Sherman Act by restricting its freedom
to contract with subcontractors of its choice. 133 .Before Bullard brought its anti-
trust suit in the district court, the union involved had filed two grievances for
arbitration in which it charged that Bullard had violated the subcontracting
clause that it had signed with the union.' 34 Bullard then brought its antitrust
suit asking the court to stay the arbitration proceedings because the subcon-
tracting agreement violated the antitrust laws.'" Bullard also filed a charge with
the NLRB alleging that the subcontracting clause violated section 8(e) of the
NLRA. ' 36 The district court did not decide whether the agreement violated
section 8(e), however, since both Bullard and the union stipulated that they
would await the NLRB's decision.'"
Connell differed from Bullard in one important respect. In Bullard the sub-
contracting agreement at issue was contained in a collective bargaining agree-
ment.'" The district court held that the union was exempt from antitrust
scrutiny because Connell was distinguishable.'" It did not explain why the
union would be exempt from antitrust scrutiny under alternative standards.
The primary question which courts should consider in cases like Bullard is
whether the bona fide bargaining requirement of the intimately related test has
been satisfied, the same question which was of primary importance in McCourl.
Under the same general facts as in Bullard, a surprisingly different case
Bullard, involved an action brought by a general contractor alleging that a collective bargaining
provision against subcontracting to nonunion subcontractors violated the antitrust laws. Id. at
1386-87. The Signatory court distinguished Connell because (1) the subcontracting provision in-
volved was contained in a collective bargaining agreement, id. at 1390, (2) the court found that
the subcontracting agreement could not be used by a specific group of employers to eliminate
competition from employers outside that group, id., and (3) the subcontractors were not required
under the agreement to recognize the union unless they had been on the construction site for
more than 31 days. Id. at 1390-91. The court found that the subcontracting provision was exempt
from antitrust scrutiny because the predominant interests involved in the agreement ... are
well within the legitimate concerns of organized labor as reflected in the policy established by the
enactment of national labor legislation." Id. at 1391. The court applied no clear standards to
come to this conclusion, however. Moreover, because it had reached this conclusion, the court
found it unnecessary to consider whether application of the agreement could be considered an
unfair labor practice under 5 8(e) of the NLRA. Id. Apparently the court was willing to accept
the proposition that an agreement violating 8(e) protected interests "within the legitimate con-
cerns of organized labor." Id.
'" 464 F. Supp. at 313.
' 34 Id, at 313.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 314 n.3.
1 " Id. at 314 n.4. Had the court considered the 5 8(e) claim, it might have found that the
subcontracting clause violated 5 8(e). It could have conceivably found, therefore, that the clause
was not exempt from the Sherman Act because it did not concern a mandatory bargaining sub-
ject. See text and notes at notes 166-74 infra.
'" 464 F. Supp. at 315. The court commented: "The whole thrust of the Connell opinion
was directed at the impact caused by the absence of the collective-bargaining relationship." Id. at
316.
135 See id. at 315-17.
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would exist if a nonunion subcontractor had brought an antitrust suit attacking
the subcontracting clause signed by Bullard and the union. The subcontractor
could have brought its suit against both the union and Bullard, and both the
union and Bullard could conceivably have been held liable to the subcontrac-
tor.'" Incredibly, then, in two suits concerning the same agreement and the
same factual background, an employer would receive damages in one suit, but
would pay damages in the other. Clearly, such inconsistent results should not
be countenanced. Thus, when an employer brings suit against a union alleging
that its collective bargaining agreement with the union violates the antitrust
laws, the employer should show that it was coerced by the union into signing
the agreement — that the agreement was not the product of bona fide bargain-
ing." If the employer cannot make this showing, it would be equally at fault
with the union in a suit brought by a third party who was adversely affected by
the agreement, and therefore should not be allowed to benefit from the anti-
trust laws.
In fact, so long as the collective bargaining agreement is the product of
bona fide negotiations, it should be exempt from an antitrust suit brought by
any signatory, including signatories to agreements which have no effect on par-
ties outside the collective bargaining relationship. This result should obtain
regardless of whether the provision in question can satisfy the mandatory bar-
gaining requirement of the intimately related test. For purposes of illustration,
the factual setting of Bullard proves helpful. Suppose that Bullard knew, at the
time of negotiations, that the subcontracting clause desired by the union likely
would violate section 8(e) of the NLRA. Since a clause which violates section
8(e) probably does not concern a mandatory subject of bargaining, such a
clause would presumably be nonexempt from the antitrust laws under the in-
timately related test. Bullard, however, could gain quite a bit and lose very lit-
tle by signing an agreement containing the illegal clause. First, it could bargain
for substantial concessions from the union in return for signing the clause. 142
Second, the primary sacrifices resulting from enforcement of the clause would
be borne by nonunion subcontractors who would be prevented from doing
business with Bullard. Bullard might suffer some injury if the nonunion
' 4° See, e.g., Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir.
1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 3040 (1980); Granddad Bread v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d
1105 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3493 (1981); Calif. Dump Truck v. Associated
Gen. Contractors, 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977).
The dividing line between legitimate hard bargaining and coercion may be difficult
to define. In most cases, a union's unilateral bargaining efforts, so . long as they are not unfair
labor practices, should not amount to coercion. If a provision violates 5 8(e) of the NLRA, the
employer may prove coercion by showing that the union violated 5 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) of the NLRA.
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to force or require an employer
to enter into an agreement that violates 5 8(e).
142 "Employers may have no predatory purpose against secondary targets, but may
nevertheless be quite willing to sacrifice in the bargaining process the interests of those targets in
exchange for concessions on other bargaining issues." Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Ship-
ping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 520 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 3040 (1980).
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subcontractors could contract with Bullard at a lower price than union subcon-
tractors, but the amount of injury would probably be substantially outweighed
by concessions Bullard would receive from the union in return for signing the
agreement. Finally, knowing that the agreement is illegal, Bullard could
choose to violate it. Certainly an employer should not be allowed to bring an
antitrust suit against a union in such a case. The congressional antitrust policy
is not furthered if an employer such as Bullard is allowed to benefit from the
use of the antitrust laws. By signing its collective bargaining agreement,
Bullard showed a lack of regard for the nonunion subcontractors upon whom
the subcontracting provision potentially could impose substantial an-
ticompetitive effects. In addition, the congressional labor policy would not be
promoted by allowing an employer to gain substantial benefits by voluntarily
assenting to a potentially illegal collective bargaining provision. t"
If the union had brought suit to enforce its collective bargaining agreement in federal
court and Bullard had not filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, the federal court
possibly could have refused to allow Bullard to assert in its defense that the subcontracting clause
violated the antitrust laws. In Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959), the Supreme. Court did nut
allow the assertion of a defense of antitrust illegality in an action to enforce an otherwise valid
sales contract. M. at 521. The Court held that a defense of antitrust illegality made by a party
seeking to avoid its contractual obligations should he allowed only when failure to allow the de-
fense would "make the courts a party to the carrying out of one of the very restraints forbidden
by the Sherman Act." Id. at 520. Thus far, the rule of Kelly has been applied to labor contracts
only in cases that involve suits brought by trustees of employee benefit trusts to recoup funds
owed by employers under the terms of collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Mullins v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 105 L.R.R.M. 2579, 2580 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Huge v. Long's Hauling Co.,
Inc., 590 F.2d 457, 458 (3d Cir. 1978); Lewis v. Seanor Coal Co., 382 F.2d 437, 439 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968). In Mullins, Huge, and Lewis, the employer/defendants
argued that they should be excused from their obligations because the collective bargaining pro-
visions which required them to pay into employee benefit funds violated both the antitrust laws
and § 8(e) of the NLRA. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2580; 590 F.2d at 459, 462; 382 F.2d at 439. The
Mullins, Huge, and Lewis courts based their decisions to refrain from entertaining the employers'
antitrust illegality defenses on the rule developed by the Supreme Court in Kelly. 105 L.R.R.M.
at 2583-84; 590 F.2d at 459-60; 382 F.2d at 441. In addition, the Mullins court found that con-
siderations of equity prevented the employers from asserting an antitrust defense. 105 L.R.R.M.
at 2585.
The union in Bullard probably would have been unsuccessful in urging the district court
to refuse to hear Bullard's antitrust claims on the basis of Kelly. See Associated Milk Dealers, Inc.
v. Milk Drivers Union, Local 753, 422 F.2d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 1970) ("To discourage private
enforcement [of the antitrust laws in a case where an employer asserts an illegality defense] by re-
quiring the parties to await the arbitrator's decision would be contrary to the objectives of the
Sherman Act."). Although the rule of Kelly has had limited application to cases involving collec-
tive bargaining agreements, extension of the rule to a wider range of antitrust suits between
signatories to collective bargaining agreements may be warranted. The basic policy underlying
the rule seems to be that courts are unwilling to allow the antitrust laws to be used by parties seek-
ing to avoid their contractural obligations. When a party first freely assents to a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement and then brings an antitrust suit to invalidate that provision, the
courts should question whether the antitrust laws were meant to provide that party with a
remedy. Such an inquiry would be particularly appropriate when the labor laws provide an ade-
quate remedy, see Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Co., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2590-91, and when the party
seeking to invoke the antitrust laws has already received a substantial benefit in the form of bar-
gaining concessions by signing the agreement.
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Signatories to collective bargaining agreements, therefore, generally do not
present compelling antitrust claims. If the complaining signatory bargained for
the offending provision, it need not abide by it if it violates the labor laws. To
allow the signatory an antitrust remedy in addition, however, offends the bar-
gaining process. If the provision actually does restrain the competition of inno-
cent third parties, those parties may obtain their remedyin the courts. In fact,
they may bring their antitrust suit against all of the signatories to the agree-
ment. Only in cases where bona fide bargaining has not taken place should the
nonstatutory exemption be unavailable as between signatories. In such cases
the collective bargaining process is not compromised, since real collective
bargaining did not occur.
3. Action Brought by an Outside Party
The conflict between labor and antitrust policies sharpens when a party
outside a collective bargaining relationship brings an antitrust suit against the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement.'" In these cases the plaintiff is
Most likely to have suffered the kind of injury normally remedied by the an-
titrust laws. Occasionally, in such a suit, the third party may have been forced
to sign the challenged collective bargaining agreement. 145 Nevertheless, the
third party can still be considered outside the collective bargaining relationship
if (1) the collective bargaining agreement signed by the third party is essentially
the same as one previously negotiated and signed between the union and com-
peting employers, and (2) it is apparent that the third party had to sign the
challenged collective bargaining agreement due to economic necessity. 14"
Consistent with their position in suits brought by signatories to a collective
bargaining agreement, the majority of lower courts have been reluctant to ap-
ply the natural effects analysis of Connell to suits brought by parties outside the
1+4 See, e.g., Frito Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 7, 105 L.R.R.M. 2104 (10th Cir.
1980); Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 620 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 207 (1980); Consol. Exp., Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979),
vacated, 100 S. Ct. 3040 (1980); Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3493 (1981); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec-
trical, Etc., 579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Cal. Dump Truck v.
Associated General Contractors, 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977); National Constructors Ass'n v.
NECA, 105 L.R.R.M. 2434 (D. Md. 1980); Feather v. United Mine Workers, 494 F. Supp.
701 (D. Pa. 1980); Landscape Specialties, Inc. v. Laborers', Local 806, 477 F. Supp. 17 (C.D.
1979); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841
(N.D. Cal. 1979); Suburban Beverages v. Pabst Brewing, 462 F. Supp. 1301 (E:D. Wis. 1978).
"' See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Meat Cutters v.'
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. UMW, 620 F.2d 416 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3249 (1980); National Constructors Ass'n v. NECA, 105
L.R.R.M. 2437 (D. Ma. 1980); Feather v. United Mine Workers, 494 F. Supp. 701 (D. Pa.
1980).
146
 Thus, Jewel Tea and Pennington fit into this category while Bullard does not. There was
no evidence in Bullard that the parties had not freely negotiated and signed an original collective
bargaining agreement.
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collective bargaining relationships."' These courts have implicitly recognized
that, provided the challenged agreement does not violate laws other than the
antitrust laws, the intimately related test is better suited to accommodate con-
gressional labor and antitrust policies than the natural effects test. 148 California
Dump Truck v. Associated General Contractors 149 provides a good example of a lower
court case which rejects Connell's natural effects analysis and instead applies the
14 ' See, e.g., Frito Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 7, 105 L.R.R.M. 2104 (10th Cir.
"1980); Granddad Bread v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 49
U .S. L.W. 3493 (1981); Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 620 F.2d 416 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 207 (1980); Landscape Specialties, Inc. v. Laborers' Local 806, 477
F. Supp. 17 (D. Cal. 1979); Suburban Beverages v. Pabst Brewing, 462 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.
Wis. 1978). But see Barabas v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 765 (S. D. N.Y. 1978), aff'd,
577 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1978).
149 See, e.g., Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 620 F.2d 416 (4th Cir.
1980) (court relied on Pennington in deciding that coal operator failed to sustain its burden of proof
on the merits of its antitrust claim against the UMW); Murphy Tugboat Co., Ltd. v.
Shipowner's & Merchant's Tugboat Co., Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (court ex-
plicitly applies intimately related test to find that agreement between pilots and tugboat company
is exempt from antitrust scrutiny; agreement exempt even though not contained in a collective
bargaining agreement since collective bargaining relationship exists between parties to the agree-
ment); Suburban Beverages v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F, Supp. 1301 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (in-
timately related test implicitly applied to find that agreement between beer manufacturer and
union is exempt even though the agreement forces private distributor to stop distributing beer in
county where union drivers distribute).
In a number of cases the courts have not clearly applied either the natural effects test or
the intimately related test. The courts in these cases have apparently followed the simple rule that
an agreement is exempt if it does not violate 5 8(e) of the NLRA. See Frito Lay, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, Local 7, 105 L.R.R.M. 2104, 2111 (10th Cir. 1980); Granddad Bread v. Continental
Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1979); Landscape Specialties, Inc. v. Laborers',
Local 806, 477 F. Supp. 17, 20 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
The only lower court decision which has clearly applied Connell's natural effects analysis
is Barabas v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 765 (S. D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 577 F.2d 184 (2d
Cir. 1978). In Barabas, the American Radio Association (ARA) had negotiated a collective bar-
gaining agreement with Prudential Lines, a shipping company, which contained a provision pro-
hibiting Prudential from selling its ships without first ensuring that the ships' radio operators
would be employed by the purchasing company. Id. at 767. Prudential made arrangements to sell
thirteen of its ships. Id. at 767-68. Prudential could not ensure that its radio operators would be
employed by the purchasing company, however, because the purchasing company had a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with a rival union which prohibited such an arrangement. Id. at 768.
The ARA brought a motion in the district court for a preliminary injunction preventing
Prudential and the purchasing company from completing the sale. Id. The court denied the mo-
tion because the ARA had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 769. Applying
the natural effects test, the court held that the collective bargaining agreement was not likely to be
exempt from antitrust scrutiny because the magnitude of the restraint at issue overrode any legit-
imate labor interests. Id. at 771. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarily af-
firmed the decision of the district court on the very next day without holding that the district
court's findings regarding the probability of success were correct. 577 F.2d at 185.
Had the district court in Barabas applied the intimately related test, it probably would
have found that the agreement was exempt. The agreement concerned a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining negotiated at arm's-length because the district court found that it did not
violate 5 8(e) of the NLRA. 451 F. Supp. at 770. See note 91 supra. In addition, there was no
evidence that the ARA had entered into its agreement with Prudential at the behest of a nonlabor
group.
149 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977).
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intimately related test. In Dump Truck, a group of independent dump truck
operators alleged that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 36
(Local 36) combined and conspired with several groups of contractors in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act.'" Local
36 had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the contractors which
provided that the owner-operators should receive a rate of pay not less than the
rate paid to drivers belonging to Local 36, and that owner-operators must be
cleared by Local 36 in order to work for signatory contractors.'" The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the owner-operators
had failed to allege with specificity any combination or conspiracy not based on
the collective bargaining agreement,'" and therefore dismissed the complaint
with leave to amend.'" Dump Truck was unlike Connell in three ways: (1) there
was no indication that the union attempted to control the market directly, (2)
there was a collective bargaining agreement, and (3) there was a desire on the
part of the union to represent the general contractor's employees. 154 Since these
factors, important to the Supreme Court in Connell, were not present, the
Ninth Circuit applied/ewe/ Tea's intimately related test. ' 55
 The court held that
the collective bargaining agreement was exempt because it concerned man-
datory bargaining subjects.'"
The Ninth Circuit was correct in utilizing the intimately related test to
determine whether the nonstatutory exemption from antitrust scrutiny should
apply. In cases involving only voluntary signatories to a collective bargaining
agreement, the defending party should be entitled to the nonstatutory exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws if the collective bargaining provision in question is
the subject of bona fide, arm's-length bargaining.'" When an innocent party
outside the collective bargaining relationship brings an antitrust suit, however,
the interest in protecting the congressional antitrust policy increases. The party
bringing suit serves as a private attorney general, protecting the interests of
unknown parties who may be injured by such agreements. If an agreement has
an anticompetitive effect only upon signatories, however, the interest in protect-
ing the congressional antitrust policy applies only to a limited, well-defined
group of parties, all of whom were responsible for the execution of the agree-
ment. A party outside the collective bargaining relationship may suffer severely
from the effects of an agreement for which it was not responsible, and which
156
 Id. at 609.
'" Id. To be cleared by Local 36, the owner-operators had to present proof of ownership
at Local 36's headquarters. Id. at 613.
' 52 See id. at 615. Such allegations would have shown that the agreement was obtained at
the behest of nonlabor groups. As a result, the Pennington requirement of the intimately related
test would not be satisfied.
153 Id. at 609.
154 Id. at 612-13.
' 55 Id. at 613-14.
' 56 Id. at 614.
" 7
 See text and notes at notes 140-42 supra.
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may have been designed for the purpose of eliminating parties outside of the
agreement from a competitive market. Therefore, the collective bargaining
provision should completely satisfy the requirements of the intimately related
test before it is exempted. Not only must the provision have been the subject of
bona fide bargaining, but also it must concern a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing, and it must not have been entered into at the behest of a nonlabor group
for an anticompetitive purpose.
The accommodation of congressional labor and antitrust policies is prop-
erly achieved when Jewel Tea's intimately related test is applied in antitrust
suits brought by parties outside a collective bargaining relationship. The test
which the Supreme Court developed in Jewel Tea is preferable to Connell's
natural effects analysis for three reasons. First, the intimately related test pro-
vides a court with more predictable criteria to utilize in determining whether
an exemption should apply. Second, a court applying the intimately related
test can more easily avoid prematurely weighing the merits of an antitrust
claim in deciding whether the exemption from the antitrust laws should be
available. Finally, the intimately related test affords greater protection to the
collective bargaining process.
The criteria utilized in the intimately related test are relatively concrete
and predictable. While the intimately related test may be characterized as a
balancing test,'" it gauges primarily the extent to which the congressionally
protected collective bargaining process is involved. The basic issues presented
in determining if the intimately related test is satisfied — whether the agree-
ment concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining, and whether it was
negotiated through bona fide arm's-length bargaining — are issues often
litigated in the labor field. Courts determining these issues may rely upon a
solid body of case precedent for guidance. Therefore, if a provision in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement concerns a mandatory bargaining subject
negotiated at arm's length, the inquiry is ended unless the agreement was
entered into by the union at the behest of a nonlabor group. 159 The agreement
is exempt regardless of the nature, extent, or magnitude of the restraint it im-
poses.'"
The natural effects test, on the other hand, provides a balancing test
which may be ambiguous and subjective. Using the natural effects test, a court
can hold any agreement to be nonexempt from the antitrust laws if the court
determines that the nature, magnitude, and effect of the alleged restraint out-
1S8 See Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Electrical, Etc., 579 F.2d 484, 503 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
158 See text and notes at notes 59-73, supra.
"8 There is some language in Jewel Tea which could be construed to suggest that even an
agreement which satisfies the intimately related test may be nonexempt if the "relative impact"
of the agreement on the product market outweighs "the interests of union members." 381 U.S.
at 690 n.5. No court has yet found, however, that an agreement which satisfies the intimately
related standards is not exempt from the antitrust laws because of its impact on the product
market without relying on Connell. See text and notes at notes 114-23 supra.
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weigh considerations requiring protection of the congressional labor policy. 16 '
A court applying the natural effects test could hold that an agreement is not ex-
empt from antitrust even though it satisfies the intimately related test by arbi-
trarily reasoning that the agreement restrains trade more than necessary to
achieve a legitimate labor goal.
The intimately related test is also preferable to the natural effects test
because the natural effects test too easily allows the judiciary to determine
whether an agreement is exempt from the antitrust laws by making a pre-
liminary determination as to whether an antitrust violation, in fact, occurred.
The Supreme Court has instructed the trial courts first to determine whether
an agreement is exempt and then, if the agreement is nonexempt, to determine
whether the agreement actually violates the antitrust laws.' 62 These two
separate inquiries should not be considered simultaneously.' 63 Thus, where
provisions in collective bargaining agreements are alleged to violate the anti-
trust laws, the intimately related test offers the most certain and logical ap-
proach to the exemption problem. First, in determining whether to apply the
nonstatutory exemption, a court may use the intimately related test to measure
the extent to which the collective bargaining process is involved. If the inti-
mately related test is not satisfied, the interest in protecting the collective
bargaining process is sufficiently weak that the exemption from antitrust
scrutiny should not apply. Then, the court may examine the nature, effect, and
magnitude of the restraint which the agreement imposes as it considers the
antitrust claim on its merits.
A court applying the natural effects analysis, however, must examine the
nature, effect, and magnitude of an alleged restraint in determining whether it
is exempt from the antitrust laws. Therefore, under the natural effects test,
only agreements which impose a minimal anticompetitive restraint are likely to
be held exempt from the antitrust laws. If only agreements which are not likely
to impose restraints severe enough to violate the antitrust laws are held to be
exempt, the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws is
eviscerated. An exemption is presumably created to exempt agreements which
are otherwise illegal — not merely agreements which are legal from the begin-
ning.
161 See, e.g. , Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir.
1979), vacated on other grounds, 48 U.S.L.W. 3849 (1980). "The requirements for antitrust exemp-
tion [under Connell] are, first, that the market restraint advance a legitimate labor goal, and sec-
ond, that the agreement restrain trade no more than is necessary to achieve that goal." Id. at
517-18.
'" Federal Maritime Com'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 61 (1978).
' 63 The method of analysis used in Connell itself gave the impression that the Court was
considering exemption and antitrust issues simultaneously. The district court below in Connell
was put in the unenviable position of having to decide whether the agreement between Local 100
and Connell Company violated the Sherman Act .when the Supreme Court had already noted
that the agreement had "substantial anticompetitive effects," 421 U.S. at 625, and that it im-
posed a restraint of considerable magnitude. Id. at 625-26. Accordingly, it is not surprising that
the case never went back to trial.
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A final reason why the intimately related test is better suited than the
natural effects test for use in antitrust suits brought by parties outside a collec-
tive bargaining relationship is that the intimately related test better protects the
collective bargaining process. Because the intimately related test is less am-
biguous than the natural effects test,'" its application by the courts is more
predictable and uniform. If the collective bargaining process is to be regulated
by the antitrust laws, it is best regulated in a consistent fashion.
The natural effects test inadequately protects the congressional labor
policy in this type of suit because it injects an unwarranted element of uncer-
tainty into the collective bargaining process.'" Employers and unions would be
inhibited from reaching agreements on important subjects if Connell's natural
effects analysis were to be routinely applied. They could know that an agree-
ment concerned a mandatory subject of bargaining negotiated at arm's length,
and they could know that the union had not entered into the agreement at the
behest of nonlabor groups. The parties could never be certain, however, that
the agreement could not restrain trade more than necessary to achieve a legiti-
mate labor goal. At the time of the bargaining, the parties should not be re-
quired to foresee what anticompetitive effects an agreement which satisfies the
intimately related test might have in the future.
A survey of lower court cases involving antitrust challenges to otherwise
legal collective bargaining provisions reveals that the lower courts have been
reluctant to rely on the Connell decision. In suits brought by signatories, the pri-
mary question to be asked by the courts should be whether bona fide arm's-
length bargaining has taken place. In suits brought by parties outside the col-
lective bargaining relationships, the courts should ask whether the more strin-
gent requirements of the intimately related test have been satisfied. The Connell
decision has created special problems, however, for cases which involve collec-
tive bargaining provisions held to be illegal under the labor laws. This type of
case is considered separately in the following section.
B. Where Collective Bargaining Provisions are Illegal Under the Labor Laws
In Connell, the Supreme Court held that the Connell/Local 100 agreement
violated section 8(e) of the NLRA.'" The Court observed that the methods
used by Local 100 should not be exempt from antitrust scrutiny simply because
the goal which Local 100 sought to achieve was legitimate. 167 Furthermore, the
Court found that Congress, at least with respect to section 8(e), did not intend
that the labor laws should provide the exclusive remedy for a section 8(e) viola-
tion.' 68 The Court did not indicate, however, the extent to which its decision
164 See text and notes at notes 107-09 supra.	 •
165 See Comment, Labor-Antitrust: Collective Bargaining and the Competitive Economy, 20
STAN, L. REV, 684, 690 (1968).
I" 421 U.S. at 626.
'" Id. at 625.
168 Id. at 634.
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that the agreement violated section 8(e) influenced its decision that the agree-
ment was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 169
The question raised by the Connell Court's holding regarding section 8(e)
is whether a union will be nonexempt from the antitrust laws whenever it uses
illegal methods."° Almost invariably this question concerns whether a collec-
tive bargaining provision which violates section 8(e) of the NLRA should ever
be exempt from the antitrust laws. There has been some disagreement among
the lower courts as to whether a section 8(e) violation precludes application of
the nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws,'" but only one lower court
has directly confronted the question.
169
 The Court first held that the agreement should not be exempt from the antitrust
laws. Id. at 625. Then it held that the agreement violated 5 8(e) of the NLRA. Id. at 633.
170
 A union uses "illegal methods" for the purpose of this discussion when it violates
laws other than the antitrust laws. A union may use illegal methods when its agreement with ar ,
employer violates express provisions of the labor laws, or possibly when a union agrees with an
employer to utilize violent methods against a third party in order to achieve its goals. But see 7
J.O. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS 5 48.03(1) where the
author suggests that a union uses illegal methods when it violates the labor laws, or when the
agreement has a "direct anticompetitive effect on the product or business market." Id.
The question whether a union might be nonexempt from the antitrust laws whenever it
uses illegal methods other than methods which violate 5 8(e) cannot be answered until the
Supreme Court determines whether Congress intended the labor laws to provide the exclusive
remedy for 5 8(b)(4) violations. In Connell, the Court found that Congress did not intend that the
labor laws should provide the exclusive remedy for 5 8(e) violations, 421 U.S. at 634, but the
Court expressly left open the question whether the labor laws provide an exclusive remedy for
violations of 5 8(b)(4). Id. Section 303 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 5 187 (1976), provides that any
party who has suffered damages as a result of 5 8(b)(4) violations committed by a union may
bring suit against the union for actual damages. The Connell Court noted that 5 303 did not apply
to 5 8(e) violations because Congress did not amend 5 303 to include 8(e) violations when 5 8(e)
was enacted in 1959. 421 U.S. at 634 n.16. When a union coerces an employer to sign an agree-
ment that violates 5 8(e), or strikes to force an employer to sign such an agreement, however, the
union has committed an unfair labor practice under 55 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) or 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) which may
be remedied in an action for damages under 5 303 of the LMRA. Lower courts have allowed
employers to bring antitrust suits where both 55 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) or 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) have been
violated, and where the 5 303 damage remedy is available. Curiously, these courts failed to dis-
cuss the issue whether 5 303 of the LMRA provides the exclusive remedy for an 8(b)(4) violation.
See, e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 105 L.R.R.M. 2741, 2747 (D. Del. 1980);
Altemose Constr. Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 104 L.R.R.M. 2856, 2863-64 (D.N. 1 1980);
Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S.
Ct. 3040 (1980).
171
 The Second Circuit has commented in dicta that a determination that a clause
violates 5 8(e) does not "necessarily" preclude the availability of an antitrust exemption,
although it "lends support" to a contention that the clause cannot be exempt from the antitrust
laws. Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of America, 553 F.2d 793, 801-02
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977). But .tee id. at 803-04 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
The Third Circuit, however, has stated that a finding by the NLRB of an unfair labor
practice "precludes recognition of a complete nonstatutory antitrust immunity." Consolidated
Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 518 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 3040
(1980). This statement has been criticized as being overly broad since it extends to all unfair
labor practices rather than only to 5 8(e) violations. 710. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATIONS 5 48.03(2) (1979). See note 170 supra.
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The Third Circuit, in Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n
(Conex)172 found that a collective bargaining provision which violates section
8(e) of the NLRA is generally nonexempt under traditional application of
either Connell's natural effects test or Jewel Tea's intimately related test. Under
Connell's natural effects test, a collective bargaining provision which violates
section 8(e) is not exempt from the antitrust laws, provided that the provision
imposes a direct and substantial anticompetitive effect on a product or business
market. Likewise, under Jewel Tea's intimately related test, such a provision is
nonexempt provided that the following propositions are accepted: (1) that an
agreement concerning a nonmandatory bargaining subject cannot be exempt
from the antitrust laws, 173 and (2) that an illegal bargaining provision does not
concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 14 The Conex court de-
cided, however, that in some cases strict application of the natural effects or in-
timately related tests would burden the congressional labor policy more than it
would promote antitrust objectives.'" Accordingly, it devised a modified test
that could be applied in those cases. 16
The facts of Conex are as follows. The litigation in Conex resulted from the
use of huge containers in the shipping industry.'" Because these containers can
be unloaded directly from a ship's hold onto trucks without being opened,
fewer longshoremen are needed to unload containerized ships than conven-
1 " 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 3040 (1980). See note 186 infra.
1 " The Supreme Court has not expressly held that a bargaining provision which does
not concern a mandatory bargaining subject must always be nonexempt from the antitrust laws.
This note argues that the requirement of a mandatory bargaining subject is unwarranted in cases
where the party challenging a provision is a party who took part in negotiating that provision. See
text at note 159 supra. When a stranger to the collective bargaining agreement brings an antitrust
suit, however, a holding that the challenged provision does not have to concern a mandatory
bargaining subject would be inconsistent with the Court's reasoning in Jewel Tea.
1 " Since a party should not be allowed to insist to the point of a bargaining impasse
upon the inclusion of an illegal provision in a collective bargaining agreement, it would follow
that an illegal bargaining provision does not specifically concern a mandatory bargaining subject,
even though the general subject which the provision at least in part concerns (e.g., subcontract-
ing) is mandatory. Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 513 (3d
Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 3040 (1980); National Maritime Union (Texaco Co.), 78
N.L.R.B. 971, 981-82 (1948), enf'd, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954
(1950). See also NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 360 (1958) (Harlan,
J., concurring and dissenting); Local 1049, Electrical Workers, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1979).
1" Id. at 519-21.
1 " Id.
'" Contx does not by any means reflect the only controversy caused by containerization
in the shipping industry. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 100 S. Ct.
2305 (1980), aff'g, 613 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1979); International Longshoremen's Association,
AFL-CIO (Consolidated Express, Inc.), 221 N.L.R.B. 956 (1975), enforced, 537 F.2d 706 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); International Longshoremen's Association and
New York Shipping Association, Inc. (Dolphin Forwarding, Inc.), 236 N. L. R. B. 525 (1978); In-
ternational Longshoremen's Association, et al. (Associated Transport, Inc.), 231 N.L.R.B. 351
(1977).
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tional ships; the containers themselves do not have to be unloaded until they
reach their final inland destination. 18 In an effort to halt this development, the
International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) negotiated a collective bar-
gaining agreement with maritime shippers, including the New York Shipping
Association, which contained provisions governing the use of containers in the
shipping industry (Rules on Containers). 19 The Rules of Containers were de-
signed to prevent freight consolidators who did not employ ILA members from
loading or unloading containers within fifty miles of the docks,' 8° thereby giv-
ing the ILA exclusive control over most such work.
Consolidated Express (Consolidated) was engaged in the business of con-
solidating the cargo of low-volume shippers who had less than a container load
of cargo to be shipped.'" Since the freight could be consolidated away from the
docks, Consolidated did not use longshoremen to load and unload its con-
tainers.'" Because the Rules on Containers significantly curtailed the amount
of freight consolidating business available to Consolidated, Consolidated and
another freight consolidator brought a suit for treble damages against the ILA,
the New York Shipping Association, and various member-employers of the
New York Shipping Association alleging that the Rules on Containers violated
the antitrust laws.'" The circuit court accepted the NLRB's previous finding' 84
that the Rules on Containers were not a valid work preservation agreement,'"
and that the Rules were therefore illegal under section 8(e) of the NLRA. 185
Although the Rules on Containers were contained in a collective bargain-
ing agreement, the Conex court did not distinguish Connell. It found that two
important factors present in Connell were also present in Conex. First, the union
in both cases had sought to achieve a legitimate labor goal — work preservation
in Conex, organization of subcontractors in Connell — but in both cases the
'" 602 F.2d at 498.
'" Id.
'° Id.
" 1 Id.
182 See id.
'" Id. at 501. Consolidated Express also sought actual damages against the union under
S 303(b) of the LMRA, alleging that the union had committed an unfair labor practice in viola-
tion of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the LMRA. Id. See note 170 supra.
1 " Consolidated Express, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 956 (1975).
18 ' A primary work preservation clause is designed to prevent work which has been per-
formed "traditionally" by union members from being contracted out to other workers or
eliminated entirely. NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 311 (1977). The
Supreme Court has held that primary work preservation clauses are not prohibited under 5 8(e).
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639 (1967).
"6
 Id. at 511-12. The Supreme Court vacated Conex and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of its decision in NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 100 S. Ct.
2305 (1980). In International Longshoremen's Ass'n, the Court held that the NLRB had improperly
defined the nature of work performed in loading and unloading containers as work which had not
"traditionally" been conducted by the union. Id. at 2318. The Court ordered the NLRB to
reconsider whether the Rules on Containers was a primary work preservation provision that
would not violate S 8(e). Id.
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method used was held to violate section 8(e) of the NLRA and was therefore il-
legal.'" Second, both courts found that the agreements in question had signifi-
cant anticompetitive impacts.'" Applying its understanding of the natural ef-
fects test,'" the Conex court found that the anticompetitive effects of the Rules
outweighed the advancement of legitimate labor goals.' 9° In addition, the court
applied the intimately related test to the facts presented, and found that
because the Rules violated section 8(e) of the NLRA, they did not concern a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. ' 9 ' The court recognized, therefore,
' that when a union has used illegal methods in a collective bargaining agree-
ment to achieve its goals, the nonstatutory exemption from antitrust scrutiny
may be equally unavailable under either the natural effects or the intimately
related tests. 192 Thus, the court was compelled to hold that the Rules could not
be completely exempt from the antitrust laws.'"
Nevertheless, the Conex court reasoned that the national labor policy
would not be properly accommodated if all parties who had negotiated
agreements violating section 8(e) of the NLRA were automatically subject to
antitrust suits for treble damages. 194 Consequently, the court argued that some
agreements violating section 8(e) might be entitled to a partial exemption from
the antitrust laws. Such an exemption would allow injunctive relief but bar tre-
ble damage awards.'" According to the court, the exemption was necessary for
the protection of the collective bargaining process.' 96 The court reasoned that
the purpose of allowing antitrust suits for damages in the context of collective
bargaining was "to encourage the parties to the collective bargaining process to
take into account anticompetitive injury to secondary parties.'" 97 That pur-
pose, however, could not be served if the parties could not foresee, at the time
of bargaining, that they might be subject to antitrust damages.'" Often a party
could not foresee that a provision would violate sections 8(b)(4) or 8(e) because
of unanticipated shifts in the NLRB's interpretation of those sections, 199 or
because of inconsistencies in interpretation by the courts. 20° Consequently, the
'" 602 F.2d at 512.
188 Id. at 518.
299 The requirements for antitrust exemption are, first, that the market restraint ad-
vance a legitimate labor goal, and, second, that the agreement restrain trade no more than is
necessary to achieve that goal." Id. at 517-18. The court believed that the "Connell mode of
analysis is similar to that of the jewel Tea majority." Id. at 517.
' 9° Id. at 518.
I" Id.
192 See notes 171-72 supra.
' 9 ' 602 F.2d at 518.
' 94 Id. at 519-20.
299 Id.
296 Id. at 520.
'" Id.
299 Id.
299 Id. at 521.
20° For example, there is currently a split in the circuits regarding the scope of the con-
struction industry proviso to 8(e). The Ninth Circuit, in Pacific Northwest Chapter, Etc. v.
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court found that even where it has been shown that a particular provision in a
collective bargaining agreement violates sections 8(e) or 8(b)(4), the provision
might still be exempt from damages under the antitrust laws if a determination
of illegality under sections 8(e) or 8(b)(4) was not reasonably foreseeable. 20 '
The Conex court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether,
at the time of negotiation, the parties could not reasonably foresee that the pro-
vision would be held unlawful under section 8(e). 202
The foreseeability test advocated in Conex does have shortcomings. The
court did not consider that an additional purpose of antitrust damages is to
compensate a secondary party for injury received as a result of an anticompeti-
tive agreement reached between the parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 203
 Nor did the court consider whether injection of the issue of
foreseeability into labor/antitrust cases would have the effect of further confus-
ing the law concerning the nonstatutory exemption by adding one more vari-
able for the courts to take into consideration.
In spite of these shortcomings, Conex's foreseeability test should be
adopted. 204
 Absent adoption of such a test, the freedom of parties to bargain
collectively could be significantly restrained. 205
 For example, a union might
want to negotiate a provision which, because of the unsettled nature of the law,
NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979), has held that "the construction industry proviso extends
shelter only when a collective bargaining relationship exists and even then only when the
employer or his subcontractor has employees who are members of the signatory union at work at
some time at the jobsite at which the employer wishes to engage a nonunion subcontactor." Id. at
1347. The District of Columbia Circuit, however, in Donald Shriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 105
L.R.R. M. 2818 (D.C. Cir. 1980), has expressly refused to apply the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the construction industry proviso. Id. at 2831. According to the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, a subcontracting provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement is within the con-
struction industry proviso even if it is not limited to particular jobsites at which signatory union
workers [are] already employed." Id. at 2834-35.
In fact, the parties who negotiated the Rules on Containers at issue in Conex clearly could
not have foreseen whether they would violate 5 8(e), since that question has yet to be finally
resolved by the courts. See note 186 supra.
20 ' 602 F.2d at 521.
2° 2 Id. The Conex decision was subsequently vacated, however. See note 186 supra.
202 On remand, Consolidated Express would have been able to obtain an award for ac-
tual damages under 5 303 of the LMRA even if the district court would hold that it was un-
•foreseeable that the Rules on Containers would violate 4 8(e). A finding of unforeseeability by
the district court, however, would have precluded Consolidated Express from obtaining a
damage award from the employers who had signed the Rules on Containers. See id. at 520.
704
 The foreseeability test adopted in Conex was subsequently applied in Feather v.
United Mine Workers, 494 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Pa. 1980). In Feather, a group of coal haulers
brought a suit for damages against the UMW. They alleged (I) that the UMW had negotiated a
collective bargaining provision with coal operators which violated 5 8(e) because the operators
agreed to contract out work for the transportation of coal only to haulers who had signed a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the UMW, id. at 703, and (2) that the UMW violated 5 8(b)(4)
, (ii)(B) of the NLRA and 55 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by striking to force the coal haulers to
sign the agreement. Id. The district court held for the coal haulers on all of their allegations. Id, at
720. Nevertheless, the district court held that a treble damage award should .not be allowed
against the union because, at the time of bargaining, reasonable negotiators could not have
known of a 5 8(b)(4) or 5 8(e) risk. Id. at 718-19.
205 See Cortex, 602 F. 2d at 520-21.
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might be illegal and hence nonmandatory. The employer might be willing to
accept the provision in order to gain concessions in other areas. Due to the
possibility that both parties might be subject to an antitrust suit for treble
damages, they might nevertheless fail to reach an agreement, even though the
provision ultimately might be held legal. If a treble damage recovery is allowed
"whenever the agreement is found to be illegal, the scales tilt too far away from
the national interest in collective bargaining over arguably legitimate subject
matters. " 206 Thus, in suits brought by parties outside the collective bargaining
agreement where it has been shown that the collective bargaining provision in
question violates section 8(e) of the NLRA, the nonstatutory exemption from
the antitrust laws should ordinarily be unavailable. Yet if the defending party
can show that it could not have foreseen, at the time of bargaining, that the
agreement would be held to violate section 8(e), no treble damage remedy
should be awarded.
CONCLUSION
Prior to Connell, a collective bargaining provision was exempt from an-
titrust scrutiny if it concerned a mandatory bargaining subject negotiated
through bona fide bargaining, provided that the agreement was not entered in-
to at the behest of a nonlabor group for an anticompetitive purpose. In Connell,
the Supreme Court held that an agreement which was not the product of collec-
tive bargaining was not exempt from the antitrust laws. To reach this result,
the Court used a method of analysis which focused on the nature, effect, and
magnitude of the alleged restraint caused by the agreement. This method of
analysis, if applied to collective bargaining agreements, could be used to sub-
ject agreements to antitrust scrutiny which had heretofore been exempt from
the antitrust laws. The lower courts have implicitly recognized, however, that
application of Connell's natural effects test to collective bargaining provisions
would not promote the congressional labor policy favoring collective bargain-
ing. Thus, in such cases, the lower courts have either distinguished Connell
outright, or reached decisions which are consistent with the intimately related
test established in jewel Tea and Pennington. A court properly accommodates
labor and antitrust policies in suits involving only voluntary signatories to col-
lective bargaining provisions which are legal under the labor laws by exempt-
ing all provisions obtained through bona fide bargaining. In suits brought by
parties outside the collective bargaining relationship, all requirements of the
intimately related test should be satisfied. Collective bargaining provisions
which are illegal under the labor laws may not be exempt under any method of
analysis which has thus far been endorsed by the Supreme Court. A proper ac-
commodation of the congressional labor policy with the congressional antitrust
policy might not be achieved, however, under either the intimately related test
"6 Id. at 521.
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or the natural effects test if the full range of antitrust remedies were allowed in
all such cases. The foreseeability test developed by the Third Circuit in Conex
should therefore be adopted by the courts.
The nonstatutory exemption is a judicially created doctrine designed to
protect the collective bargaining process from antitrust regulation. Parties at
the bargaining table derive little benefit from the nonstatutory exemption if the
standards for its application remain as vague and unpredictable as they are in
the Connell decision. If the standards for the nonstatutory exemption are more
clearly defined, along the lines set out in Jewel Tea, the nonstatutory exemption
may better serve its purpose. Bargaining parties will know with some assurance
— at the time of bargaining, and not after years of costly litigation — whether a
particular provision is subject to antitrust scrutiny.
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